



Daily Report

Supplement

Central Eurasia

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Central Eurasia SUPPLEMENT

FBIS-SOV-95-076-S

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Political Issues

***Gorbachev Foundation, Chechnya Financial Link Revealed**

954E0826A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in
Russian 5 Apr 95 pp 1, 2

[Article by Boris Yamshanov: "Sovereignty for Bucks: A Sensational Find in a Grozny Bank—Will It Shed Light on the Secrets of the Chechen Drama?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Documents have been found at NIISO Kreditprombank in Grozny, the bank where Dudayev's presidential account was deposited, which are not only astounding but also raise many questions.

The list of documents opens with a letter written on the official letterhead of the Chechen Republic Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs. The following is the full text of that document:

"To the Chairman of the Chechen Republic Cabinet of Ministers:

The Gorbachev Foundation has expressed its willingness to cooperate with the Chechen Republic with regard to establishment of full-scale relations between the Chechen Republic and the Russian Federation (including the process of recognition of the Chechen Republic by the Russian Federation).

The entire job is estimated at \$50,000 US. The amount of \$10,000 US will be required to begin work. I request that you allocate that amount for the signing of a contract with the Gorbachev Foundation.

Yu. Soslambekov, chairman"

The signature of the chairman of the committee on foreign affairs does not appear suspicious.

Another piece of parliamentary stationery contains this laconic document:

"To T. Abubakarov, minister of economics and finance:
Directive

Allocate \$10,000 US to the Chechen Republic Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs for the purpose of concluding a contract with the Gorbachev Fund.

Kh. Akhmadov, Chairman, Chechen Republic Parliament"

The document is signed, stamped No 2762, and dated 8 December 1992. Yet on 7 December 1992 a handwritten note was added which read: "To comrade M. Sinelnikova. For implementation. Abubakarov"

As is plainly evident from these documents, the process had been set in motion. However, subsequently it took an unexpected zigzag. We have before us "Contract No 25/2," dated 10 December 1992 and concluded between the SiS Limited Company (executor), represented by Mr.

Sh. M. Smotrinskiy, general director, and the Chechen Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs (the client), represented by Mr. Yu. Solambekov, whom we have already met. The subject of the contract is worthy of being reproduced verbatim:

"The client assigns (accepts) and the executor assumes (transfers) performance of a research study on 'Development of Concepts for Relations Between: Chechnya and the Russian Federative Center; the Russian Federative Center and Chechnya; the Russian Federative Center, the States of the Caucasus Region and the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus.'"

In addition, the contract also stipulates the dates for performance of the study in its entirety and the sections thereof, procedure for their delivery and acceptance, and the cost, in the aforementioned amount of \$50,000 US, with a \$10,000 advance to be paid within three days after the contract is signed. Special notice is given that "the payment is to be made in cash U.S. dollars."

A handwritten note by Solambekov indicates that the parties to the contract successfully reached agreement and did not even wait three days—the sum of \$10,000 was received on the same date, 7 December 1992. The parties' addresses were also indicated: for the client, 40 prospekt Pobedy, Grozny; for the executor, 6 Borovskiy prospekt, Apt. 36, Moscow. The signature is backup up by a stamp that reads: "City of Moscow, Zapadnyy Administrative District-3, SiS Limited Company."

This is the riddle that came to light in a pile of papers in a Chechen bank. If you read it horizontally it says "Gorbachev Foundation." If you read it vertically, some unknown "SiS." There would appear to be no connection between them—there were many who signed contracts with Chechnya. Except that the phrase we are searching for diagonally is the same for both: "a concept for full-scale relations..." And the key to the riddle is like the mark of Cain: the same \$50,000 dollars, from the same set of hands.

The second question: if the "executors" are not just common swindlers, then what are they counting on when they officially assume obligations, performance of which is blatantly illegal and even unconstitutional? Just think about the meaning of the words "relations between the Russian Federative Center (?), the states of the Caucasus region and the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus." Is not the thoroughly separatist nature of the planned undertaking plain for all to see, the focus on splitting up the Russian Federation and, perhaps, flouting its Constitution?

And a third question. From the documents it is clear that it was not the Dudayevites who asked for help first; it was from Moscow that "willingness was expressed." Always in exchange for dollars, if you please. Did those doing the "expressing" understand what they were getting into and with whom they were sharing a single shaky plank? After all, Dudayev never concealed the fact that

he regarded the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus as the nucleus of his own future empire, one created against Russia's will and directed against Russia. At the very moment Contract 25/2 was being concluded arms, equipment and military settlement were being openly seized and Russian soldiers chased out of Chechnya, alive for the time being.

Was it not this sort of "interest-expressing executors" who, giving a vainglorious little mountain Napoleon the hope of supposedly secret high-level patronage in Moscow, actually spurred him on to ever more irrational and adventuristic actions, to the spilling of blood, at the sight of which people began blaming and exposing someone else? If you think about it, the essence of the research studies is in fact that very blood, paid for with Judas' 30 pieces of silver, even if this time it was in temptingly green banknotes. In cash.

Other questions also present themselves. We believe that the answers to these will be provided by the appropriate agencies—the addresses are there, and the signatures, and the stamps. But people are also going to want a personal reaction from those who, wittingly or unwittingly, were involved in this unsavory episode.

***Directive Replaces Shakhray as Working Group Head**

954E0826B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian 5 Apr 95 p 16

[Russian Federation Government Directive No 411-r, issued 27 March 1995]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. To appoint N. D. Yegorov, deputy chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, to serve as head of the working group on the distribution and oversight of the use and reimbursement of funds from the federal fund for state financial support for the supply of products (goods) into regions of the Far North and equivalent areas, as established by Russian Federation Government Directive No 645-r, issued 6 May 1994 (SOBRANIYE ZAKONODATELSTVA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, 1994, No 3, p 277; 1994, No 5, p 575; 1994, No 33, p 3523), relieving S. M. Shakhray, deputy chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, of those duties.

2. To include the following individuals as members of the working group indicated in Point 1 of this directive: V. G. Artyukhov, RF first deputy minister of finance; V. I. Andronchik, RF deputy minister for nationalities affairs and regional policy; A. Kh. Nyach, deputy department head, RF Government Apparatus; and T. M. Davydov, deputy department director, RF Central Bank (by agreement), removing B. M. Izhin, T. V. Paramonov and V. A. Petrov from membership in the working group.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, Chairman, Government of the Russian Federation

***Evidence of Ties Between Lobov, Japan's Aum Sect Examined**

954F2033A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 6 Apr 95 p 4

[Reports by *IZVESTIYA* Tokyo correspondent Sergey Agafonov and *IZVESTIYA* Moscow correspondent Arkadiy Zheludkov: "Millions of Dollars, a 'Secret Adviser,' and Silence at the Top"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Report by Sergey Agafonov Last week *IZVESTIYA* turned twice to a subject that is very unpleasant for everyone but also very topical—the beginnings of Russia's penetration by the Japanese religious sect AUM Shinrikyo, which is at the center of the police and procuracy investigation into its "birthplace"—Japan. This sect is being accused of kidnappings, planning mass murders, and being responsible for the terrorist act involving the use of sarin in the Tokyo subway, which took 11 lives.

Now, a week later, this topic remains hot; actually, if anything, it has become even "hotter," since the documents and evidence obtained by the Japanese authorities during numerous searches on the AUM Shinrikyo property present the "holy brotherhood" in a completely different light—as a secret organization engaged in mass production of toxic agents, experimentation with highly toxic bacteria, and other projects far removed from religion or peace.

The entire top leadership of the sect (about 100 persons), headed by AUM's founder Shoko Asahara, has gone into hiding, so the investigators do not yet have anybody they could question on substance; however, the Japanese authorities are carefully checking all the "shoots" planted by AUM Shinrikyo all over the world, suspecting on the basis of their own sad experience that these "shoots" carry poison. Russia is listed at the top among the "planting" addresses, since the sect has more branches in Russia than anywhere else and a record number of believers, and only in Russia did AUM receive such strong support.

IZVESTIYA materials named the main partner of this sect in Russia: Oleg Lobov, the current secretary of the Security Council under the Russian Federation [Russian Federation] president, to whom the newspaper addressed a number of direct questions, which to this day remain unanswered. Meanwhile, time is clearly working against the "Kremlin man's vow of silence"—literally every day, materials in the Japanese press bring fresh news and come up with new details on the sect's connections with Moscow's "top echelons."

First of all, it should be noted that Lobov's contacts with the sect leader Asahara and his close confederates were not limited to the year they became acquainted (1992) but continued on a regular basis: Lobov's move from the modest position of the council of experts' chairman to the key position of Security Council secretary did not put

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an end to the connection between the Russian politician and the Japanese guru. According, for instance, to the Japanese weekly SYUKAN GENDAI, the latest meeting between Asahara and Mr. Lobov took place in Moscow quite recently—at the end of stormy 1994, which is quite significant, considering the Security Council secretary's busy schedule.

In this connection, it is noteworthy that according to Japanese information, a little earlier—in November 1994—a message from Lobov to Asahara was delivered by Mr. Ye.A. Morozov, general secretary of the Russian-Japanese Foundation (the current name of the scandalously notorious Russian-Japanese University, founded by Lobov in 1991). This gentleman (which is also very interesting) went to Japan on a business trip not on his own, but as a member of a Russian Government delegation, headed by O.N. Soskovets, first deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation Cabinet of Ministers. According to available information, in the recent past (three years ago) Ye.A. Morozov held the job of the chief of the supply and maintenance department of the Russian Ministry of Economics, and when the Russian-Japanese University was being created, being a member of Lobov's "entourage," became member of the board of this organization.

Another noteworthy news item in the Japanese press: For the first time, it mentions the concrete amount that the Russian-Japanese University earned on organizing Asahara's magnificent debut in Moscow in March 1992—\$5 million, delivered, according to the Japanese press, in cash. (Actually, it is as yet somewhat premature to contend with certainty that this amount has been received). However, in the opinion of a number of Japanese experts, well familiar with the subject, this "university" amount is only a part of a larger budget: According, for instance, to Professor Teratani, a well-known Sovietologist, Asahara brought to Moscow for AUM presentation \$14 million, which was distributed to several Russian "pockets." The Japanese still keep secret the names of the recipients of the money. (And in this instance a most detailed investigation is in order, which, alas, is being blocked by the categorical refusal on the part of the key figures to talk to journalists).

A separate topic is the most important finding of the past few days: IZVESTIYA is now able to present to the country Lobov's personal special envoy—in a certain sense a secret adviser to the current Security Council secretary, Mr. Aleksandr Muravyev. We learned that Muravyev was the person entrusted with the mission of establishing contacts with AUM Shinrikyo, and it was he who did the preparation work on the first and all subsequent meetings between the sect leader Asahara and Oleg Lobov, coordinating all "joint work" with the sect.

During the memorable February of 1992, Muravyev (at the direct invitation of AUM Shinrikyo—this was the first of the Russian official contacts with the sect)

deplaned in Tokyo two days before the arrival of the main delegation of the Russian-Japanese University, headed by Lobov. Having registered in the Tokyo Prince hotel, the "secret adviser" conducted a series of talks with AUM representatives, in the course of which principal details of the upcoming "friendship" were discussed. Muravyev reported on the results of these talks to Lobov.

The Russian Embassy was initially completely kept away from this parallel "personal diplomacy," and Lobov, even after the information on his contacts with AUM Shinrikyo became public, made an effort to keep the figure of the "secret adviser" out of the limelight. It is known, however, that at the time Mr. Muravyev worked in the Ministry of Economics, where he was "supervising," as we are told, some "confidential matters." When the Russian-Japanese University was created, at Lobov's decision Muravyev became one of the five board members. The list of "interesting" items in the history of relations between AUM Shinrikyo and Russia and the Russian political top echelons is not limited to the aforementioned episodes. For instance, we learned from reliable and well-informed sources that during the preparations for the sect leader Shoko Asahara's visit to Moscow in March 1992, the initial plan for the business program of the Japanese "religious guest," put together by the Moscow guests and AUM partners, even envisaged meeting with President of Russia Boris Yeltsin. As the saying goes, by God's grace....

....In Japanese estimates, the scandal brewing around Lobov will be resolved by the end of this week or the beginning of next: Tokyo believes (perhaps naively?) that upon his return from vacation, Yeltsin should somehow react to the scandalous history of AUM in Russia. Time will tell whether these expectations are justified.

Report by Arkadiy Zheludkov

IZVESTIYA attempted to contact Oleg Lobov's staff and the university's administration at 14 Petrovka Street and get at least minimal explanations for all the information that has now spilled into the press. We even put together a list of questions for Oleg Lobov, which we published in IZVESTIYA (No. 58, 30 March). The University's telephones are silent. Neither does Oleg Ivanovich Lobov stoop to giving explanations to the press. This breeds numerous versions, which, as the naive Japanese believe, are harmful to the image of Russia's political leadership. And first of all that of the president.

IZVESTIYA correspondents, conducting in the capital a parallel investigation of AUM Shinrikyo activities, did manage to obtain some information regarding the establishment of AUM's branch in Moscow. Among numerous facts, so far only one remains unshakeable: the personal participation of Oleg Ivanovich Lobov and the structure he created—the Russian-Japanese University—in the successful propaganda of AUM Shinrikyo's ideas. From our conversation with the former vice

president of Russia, Aleksandr Rutskoy, one may draw the conclusion that the plan for the first official visits to Moscow of sect leader Shoko Asahara had been put together by no one else but Lobov. Aleksandr Rutskoy also contends that his meeting with Asahara took place only because at the last moment Yeltsin was unavailable.

According to Aleksandr Rutskoy, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was informed on Asahara's activities in Russia. The former vice president contends that by the time the sect's activities in Moscow began on a broader scale, he attempted to attract the president's attention to what was happening but was allegedly spurned in his noble unmasking impulse.

***MGU Holds 'Fascist' Seminar**

954F2083A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 21, 2 Apr 95 p 7

[Article by the Department of Morality and Law, under rubric "Response," on the "Politics" page: "Penalty for Racism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The editorial office of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI has received a letter signed by Professor M. Marchenko, prorector of Moscow State University [MGU].

"In regard to the publication in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI of the items 'Brown Seminar at MGU' and 'The Brown Party Does Not Have 'Its Own People,' (No.66, 1994; No. 11, 1995), I would like to report the following.

"A special commission at MGU imeni M. V. Lomonosov carried out an objective evaluation of the publications mentioned, and that commission established the following. Actually, a statement by I. Lazarenko, leader of the National Front party, had occurred at the School of Mechanics and Mathematics. The auditorium had been set aside for the conducting of a scientific seminar, but, as a consequence of the permissiveness of the seminar leader, it was used for other purposes.

"A session of the Learned Council of the School of Mechanics and Mathematics was held to discuss this matter. That session carried out a thorough evaluation of what had occurred. By MGU order No. 85, dated 10 March 1995, the seminar leader was given a strict penalty, and a rebuke was given to the dean of the school for failing to provide adequate monitoring of the use of the auditorium fund.

"The collective of Moscow University, like most of the citizens of our country, censure any forms of manifestation of fascism, which brought death and ruination to tens of millions of people. We are confronted by an important task—the task of preventing the drawing in of young people into the activities of extremist organizations, inasmuch as, in the present-day socioeconomic and political situation, the danger of that is strongly increasing.

At the same time, we direct your attention to the fact that the organization of extremist persuasion that your newspaper wrote about does not exist at MGU. I. Lazarenko is not a student of Moscow University and has nothing to do with MGU."

One should be pleased with the businesslike reaction of the MGU leadership and apologize to the readers for the inaccuracy—the hero of the item is not a student at MGU—and end the matter right there.

But there is something that hinders that. Most probably it is the light-handed, formal approach to the problems that the newspaper wrote about. "A rebuke was given to the dean of the school for failing to provide adequate monitoring of the use of the auditorium fund..." It was precisely in that spirit, in the not too distant past, that it was customary to "react" to critical statements made in the press. But the newspaper had not written that "a statement had occurred at the School of Mechanics and Mathematics" (as stated in the prorector's letter), but about regular classes at a seminar that had been in operation from October 1994 until February 1995, where representatives of odious groupings—the Right-Radical Party, the Russian National Union, the National Front party, etc.—expressed their fascist views in a thoroughgoing manner, encountering no objections.

The seminar leader was not named in the prorector's reply and his role was indicated in an extremely modest way: because of his "permissiveness," the auditorium "was used for other purposes." And yet Vadim Kolosov—a graduate of the School of Mechanics and Mathematics—not only opened and closed the auditorium, but also, during the course of the seminar, expressed himself in a completely definite manner. For example:

"The Aryan organization will return and Aryan order will return on a worldwide scale, and, naturally, it will arrive forever... Our national revolution in Russia, which is beginning, is the beginning of a universal Aryan national revolution that will establish order in all the conglomerates of space... Something that can currently serve as a basic goal is the creation of a new race of people, or a new man, or a superman..." Etc., etc.

Judging from the reply, it is not very clear precisely what the MGU administrators are planning to do to "prevent the drawing in of young people into the activities of extremist organizations." The fact that the organizers of the mentioned seminar felt so confident, and that it was so easy to buy fascist publications in the MGU lobby, indicates that the "drawing in" is occurring, and that the "brown disease" is infectious.

In recent time, persons suffering from this disease have openly increased their rate of activity, and not only at MGU.

In mid-February at the Central House of Literary Workers there was an evening sponsored by the

"Russkoye Slovo" [Russian Word] Publishing House, which publishes frankly racist books and ATAKA magazine. The leaflet inviting people to attend the evening stated, "Russia is for the Russians! God is with us! The Zhirinovskiy LDPR [Russian Liberal-Democratic Party], the Russian Writers Union, RNYe [Russian National Unity], the Russian Party, and the Pamyat [Memory] Society are conducting..." Adherents of extremist, racist actions—Dyakov, Siropayev, Shtepa, Vinogradov, Demin—spoke at the evening. Recently evenings sponsored by ultranational newspapers have been conducted more frequently: in January an evening sponsored by ERA ROSSII newspaper was held at the Movie Rerun Theater; an evening sponsored by SHTURMOVIK newspaper was held at the Komsomol's Movie Theater; etc.

Who, better than MGU, with its powerful intellectual potential and its experience in educational work, can provide an example in revealing the essential nature of the new Nazis and in preventing the fascist danger?

*Russians Polled on 'Fascism'

954F2083B Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 21, 2 Apr 95 p 7

[Article by Dmitriy Chubukov, Analysis Center, "Obshchestvennoye Mneniye" [Public Opinion] Foundation], under rubric "Public Opinion," on "Politics" page: "Fascism in Russia: Under What Banner?"

[FBIS Translated Text] The danger of fascism is being mentioned increasingly frequently and increasingly loudly. A total of 43 percent of the Russians polled believe that it is possible today in Russia for people like Hitler to come to power. At the same time everyone understands that in a country that knows, certainly not by hearsay, what fascism is, that word cannot evoke anything other than antipathy. But under what other banner can fascism lay claim to political success in our country?

The answer would seem to be clear: under the banner of aggressive nationalism (just as occurred in Germany). But do the Russians who are worried about the fascist threat have this in mind?

The answers to the question "Do you think that fascism in Russia means the granting to Russians of advantages as compared with people of other nationalities?" were distributed as follows:

	Percent
Yes	16
No	54
Undecided	30

As we can see, a large segment of society is not inclined to feel that fascism and Russian nationalism are one and

the same. But this precisely can mean that our domestic radical-nationalists, who have rejected the accusations of fascism, have chances of obtaining support among the people, especially under the conditions of economic crisis and political instability. But today, according to our data, only 15 percent of the Russians feel that the chief factor in Russia's national policy must be the protection of the interests of Russians (65 percent feel that the interests of the representatives of all nationalities must be protected identically). Incidentally, the number of those who are in favor of granting certain advantages to Russians has been decreasing in recent months.

Is it possible that fascism can be victorious in Russia under Communist banners? Our press and television have worked hard to assure that the idea of the kinship between the "Reds" and the "Browns" is firmly established in the people's consciousness. However, in response to the question "There exists the opinion that communism and fascism are one and the same. Do you agree with that?", the answers were distributed as follows:

	Percent
Yes	11
Probably yes	13
Probably no	21
No	45
Undecided	11

Obviously, the similarity of the political regimes in Hitlerite Germany and Stalinist USSR is shifted in most people's awareness into the background by reminiscences about a war in which the Communists and the fascists were irreconcilable opponents.

A considerable number of our contemporaries are afraid of a repetition in Russia of the German tragedy of the 1930's. But they have a rather confused idea of exactly what Russian fascism is, or what its banner might be. Their alarms most probably are as a result of a sense of uncertainty that was caused by the destruction of the former way of life, and as a result of the confusion concerning future prospects.

*Vedenkin, 'Fascists' Role in Business Deal Viewed

954F2083C Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 21, 2 Apr 95 p 7

[Article by Petr Fomin: "Loud 'Siren': A famous American corporation and a Russian National Unity activist have proven to be in the same company"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The competition between two projects for developing a system of automated control of air shipments in Russia—an international project with

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IBM participation, known as Sirena-3 [Siren-3], and a Russian project that has been given the name Polet [Flight]—has recently taken on a political nuance.

Recently, at their press conference, participants in the Polet project announced that they had been joined by three leading air enterprises in the capital: Vnukovo, Domodedovo, and Bykovo. However, something that became a real sensation was the statement by one of the project participants—the Aeroflot Bank that had abandoned the recently competing Sirena-3. Bank vice-president Andrey Romanchenko asserted that the bank had actually sold to Aleksey Vedenkin as a private individual its daughter enterprise, the Aeroflot Foreign-Economic Agency. Inasmuch as that agency owns a block of Sirena-3 shares, the scandalously famous activist of the Barkashov RNYe [Russian National Unity], Mr. Vedenkin proved to be a co-owner of it.

According to the bank representative, the decision to leave Sirena-3 was made when, after a serious analysis of the project, it became clear that the bank could incur considerable losses from further participation in it. During the four years of the existence of Sirena-3, Mr. Romanchenko remarked, no significant volume of work had been done, and the financial scheme proved to be so unstable that Western investors demanded guarantees of the return of funds from the Russian government. It was not simple to find buyers under such conditions: not a single one of the serious entrepreneurs who know how to count money had a burning desire to become part of the Sirena-3 project. Mr. Vedenkin was the only pretender. But it was from precisely that moment that the commercial transaction began to acquire political coloration. In any case Andrey Romanchenko was forced to explain that it is the bank's job to engage in finance, rather than in politics. Throughout the world the apolitical nature of the financial structures is considered to be a merit, rather than a shortcoming, he stated.

Probably, from a commercial point of view the sale of Sirena-3 shares was actually desirable for Aeroflot Bank. But Mr. Vedenkin, when purchasing the shares, was most probably pursuing political goals also. His statement on television to the effect that the "Russian National Movement" now intends to take under its control the entire system of selling air tickets in Russia caused a shock that was no less than the candid revelations of his hit men with a swastika that were reproduced in the same television broadcast. It must be thought that a sense of shock was also experienced by the basic foreign shareholder and general contractor of Sirena-3—the American IBM, which in this instance found itself in the same company with a figure in the Barkashov movement.

For the time being, nothing is known about the official reaction of the computer giant. However, the Alpha Investment consulting firm (the logo of which, according to IZVESTIYA, was designed in the spirit of the IBM logo, and whose postal index coincides with the index of

the Moscow representation of that corporation) has already proposed to Vedenkin that it purchase his block of Sirena-3 shares, by adding \$2 million to their value. However the transaction ends—and Vedenkin wants to get compensation for at least \$15 million more—the situation looks absurd. Although it is difficult to assume that IBM wants this outcome. However, its money can go to finance the RNYe hit men.

Incidentally, nothing is known about where RNYe keeps its accounts. Aeroflot Bank vice-president Mr. Romanchenko has not confirmed, but also has not denied, that RNYe has an account in that bank, stating that such information is provided in the legally established procedure, and emphasized the bank's nonintervention in politics as being a sphere that is not included in its competency. All of this looks logical. Except for one thing. The country must have laws banning the activities of extremist organizations, and those laws must be executed precisely. If there had previously existed an Edict on the fight against fascism and political extremism, Russian bankers would not have had to resolve the question of with whom they should or should not deal, and certain foreign companies would not have found themselves in an ambiguous situation. Without even mentioning the fact that the requested financial guarantees of the government with regard to Sirena-3, if they were offered, would have also proven to be guarantees to shareholder Vedenkin.

***Deputies Attack 'Anti-Fascist' Moves**

954F2082A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 17, 12-19 Mar 95 p 14

[Article by Alla Bossart: "Flight of the Black Valkyrie in a Dark Room"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

[Begin box] Among other events, the cultural outing by a detachment of the "black shirts" to the conservatory to hear Wagner received little attention.

[End box]

I do not recall that the informational programs reflected in some way this episode in the musical life of the capital. However, those who were present at it still recall the shock experienced at the appearance of about 30 or 40 storm troopers, in full parade dress, as if blacking out an entire section of the balcony with boot black. As they did in the movie theatres during the occupation. The dashing fellows conducted themselves most properly, demonstrating admirable loyalty, quietly squeaking with their waist-belts and their boots, and standing to applaud. Their swastika-clad arms moved rhythmically, like pendulums.

Any law-abiding citizen knows perfectly well what should be undertaken and what is usually undertaken in normal democratic society to avoid just such cultural-enlightenment demarches. The country's legislation

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clearly and succinctly prohibits the action of organizations of a fascist nature, and defines the measure of criminal responsibility for violation of the appropriate article. A Nazi organization, for example, is deprived the status of a political party, as happened recently with the Free Workers' Party in Germany. The decision of the Constitutional Court makes it possible to prohibit it from having an office and to confiscate its property. At the same time, the associates of these German comrades, a command of just such a Nazi orientation, with the same swastika on the same banners—the "Russian National Unity" movement of Barkashov—freely walks about Moscow and has a staff headquarters, a fund, and a charter, and is unhindered in preaching the idea of a fascist military dictatorship.

And so they seized Vedenkin. But it was only after the slightly dishonest ideologist divulged on television the plans to shoot Kovalev and Yushenkov.

But why is there so much noise about Vedenkin, while the party headed by Barkashov (who has already received amnesty once) is not spoken of at all, not to mention its being disbanded? And aside from Barkashov's party, in Russia there are 84 other national-patriotic and radical-right wing organizations actively operating. Among them is the Front for National-Revolutionary Action of Ilya Lazarenko—a fascist "dwarf" who is rather popular at MGU [Moscow State University], where he is studying at the jurical faculty (which is particularly comforting), and is emulating Hitler, not without a certain degree of artistry.

No one bothers them. Lazarenko granted use the university auditorium for holding a "fascist sabbath," as State Duma deputy and writer Yelena Rzhetskaya characterized this show. The inspirer of the Leningrad fascists, Viktor Bezverkhiy, was tried for publishing "Mein Kampf"—and acquitted. The military-patriotic literary association (!) "Otechestvo" ["Homeland"] was created directly at the bosom of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] within the editorial office of the journal NA BOYEVOM POSTU, and the scandalous brochure of the leader of this association, Ostretsov, entitled "Black Hundred and Red Hundred" (to the glory of the Union of the Russian people) was legally issued by "Voyenizdat." Dmitriy Vasilyev always seems to be on television. Zhirinovskiy is winning process after process. The consistent (up until now) head-hunters from the Nazi group "Werewolf" show television viewers the ears of their dead enemy—among the number of "Jews and Yankees"...

Yet in the State Duma, at the parliamentary hearings "On preventing the manifestations of the fascist danger in the Russian Federation," a deputy from the "Rossiya" faction speaks out, the leader of the "Russian All-People's Union" Party, Sergey Baburin, and in his quiet and convincing manner proposes that, by reason of the terminological confusion and overly broad interpretation of the word, "fascism," point one of the draft

resolution should be deleted: "To develop a special law prohibiting the propaganda of the fascist ideology, the use of fascist symbolism, fascist marches and other public measures, as well as to create militarized organizations by the political parties and movements, and establish international contacts with fascist and pro-fascist organizations.

Then Deputy Tiunov calls for the liquidation in the updated Criminal Code of the RF [Russian Federation] of Article 74, which deals with inciting national and racial hatred (greetings from Vedenkin), and at the same time also Article 71, on propaganda of war (greetings from Pavel Grachev). In his opinion, these articles persecute only Russians: "Where they are killing Russians—that is democracy, but one has only to say a word in defense of Russians—and that is fascism! Ritual murder of our homeland is being undertaken!" (Applause).

Then Deputy Ivanov, in a wonderfully structured speech, refuted the presence of fascist organizations in Russia, and called the mass media, and especially the "Poptsov" television, the disseminator of fascism. (Tumultuous applause).

Deputy Zhuravlev posed the question sharply: "Who needs anti-fascism?" It follows that anti-fascism was "needed" by the "Choice of Russia" faction, because its policy of "westernized modernization has experienced a collapse and it is necessary to retreat, but in a pretty fashion, under a guise which is acceptable to the American masters. For this purpose they suggest parliamentary hearings to us, and we, like fools, are sitting here and trying to catch a black cat in a dark room, a cat which, I might add, does not even exist." (Laughter). "The term 'Russian fascism' must be criminally punishable!" (Prolonged applause).

Well, and the invariable Nikolay Lysenko, the leader of the National-Republican Party of Russia, also protested against the "broad interpretation." He sharply delineated himself from fascism: "I am not a fascist, but a nationalist, and I am proud of it!" Without taking the trouble of varying his beloved argumentation, Lysenko, as usual, played his main trump card in the ideological polemics: He cannot be a fascist, because his grandfather was a bearer of the Order of the Combat Red Banner, won in the battle against fascism. The deputy tried to convince his colleagues not to believe the stories about some Lazarenko and some National Salvation Front (which he too left, we might add, after quarreling with Sazhi Umalatova over an anti-Chechen leaflet). "There is no such thing, gentlemen, but there is a definite political party 'Choice of Russia,' which is pursuing a policy of undermining the national security. It is beneficial to have trade relations with Israel, but not beneficial to have such deputies as Alla Gerber!" (Standing ovation, shouts of "Shame!").

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position," the "Zionist intelligentsia" and the "foreign marionettes." As Belyayev promised, "revenge would find them even on the other side of the ocean, as it had found Trotsky!" However, 3 days later Belyayev himself was killed under mysterious circumstances.

As before, the Russian Party remains among the number of allies of Belyayev's party. Despite the fact that Nikolay Bondarik, its leader, has been under arrest for over a year now. He is suspected of organizing the murder of one of the members of his own party: The guards of the "TEKTONFIZ" firm which he heads up beat him to death in the shower at a sporting hall. The newspaper which Bondarik edited, RECH, tells in detail about the means of creating a "unified racial space," about the methods of identifying Jews "by blood with reagents" and about setting up "zoos" for people of the "non-Aryan races." Despite Bondarik's arrest, the Russian Guard—the vanguard of the Russian Party—continues to operate.

Finally, the leaders of the St. Petersburg section of the social-patriotic movement "Derzhava" are distinguished by their sympathies to the ultra-nationalist organizations oriented toward Belyayev. Viktor Antonov, who represents the Rutskey Movement in the city, intends to cooperate with the NRPR. Known as one of the leaders of the All-Russian Party of the Monarchist Center, he is convinced that he is a fully "realistic politician." In Antonov's view, the monarchy may be restored only step by step, and for the sake of stabilization today it is justifiable to cooperate with Rutskey's movement, as well as with local extremist organizations. It is curious that, in the matter of organization of "Derzhava," the Moscow headquarters gives much attention to the St. Petersburg leaders. For example, it is specifically the Petersburg nationalists who are cooperatively preparing the 16-column newspaper DERZHAVA, which may perhaps become the central press organ of the entire movement. In Antonov's view, a strong nationalist coalition is being formed in St. Petersburg, even despite the absence of such an authoritative organization in the city as the Russian National Unity.

Another grouping is uniting within the framework of the Russian Liberation Movement (ROD). Founded in 1991, it has begun to demonstrate especially noticeable activity in Petersburg during the last year—holding weekly "Russian Days" near the monument to Catherine II, songfests next to the public library, and pickets around the consulates of Western countries... It also includes organizations such as the Humanist Party, the Men's Union, the People's Union for Support of Russian Patriots in the Organs of State Power, the Party of Russian Statehood, etc.

ROD is the heir to the "Rossy" movement, which emerged back in 1987, as well as the former Leningrad Club of Psychic Culture. The extrasensory Sergey Semenov, the head of the Spiritual Union "Tezarius," plays a special ideological role in it, and, as observers

note, also a financial role. The ROD leaders are distinguished by their orientation not toward the values of "Jewish" orthodoxy, but toward pre-Christian Slavic beliefs, toward pagan culture. They honor and worship Perun, Khors, and Dazhdbog, and they believe the swastika to be the "Slavic symbol of the sun." Upon meeting each other, they hold up their hand and pronounce the ancient Russian greeting, "Svar!". Speaking out in favor of creating a unitarian Republic of Rus, they demonstrate their hostility not only toward the West, but also toward Moscow. Work is proceeding on creating the All-Russian Conservative-Patriotic Block "Piterskiy." Under the patronage of the ROD, the Russian "Druzhina" [volunteer detachment] has been formed, which today numbers up to 200 members. "Physically strong men over 16 years of age" with a "national self-awareness" and "firmness of character" are invited to join the druzhina. We may say that this is a synthesis of a guard bureau and a club for conducting self-education in accordance with the "Russian tradition."

The ROD and the Russian druzhina stand aside from the "orthodox" nationalists. Even at the elections to the city assembly, they acted as the independent block "Petrograd." The effort to establish close cooperation with Yuriy Belyayev's grouping was unsuccessful.

The Union of Veneds, headed by Viktor Bezverkhiy, is close to this group. It is interesting, I might add, that Bezverkhiy approved of Yeltsin's edict, proposing to define fascism according to the French philosopher Teyar de Chardain: As "group egoism," of which, in Bezverkhiy's opinion, almost all the Russian leaders today are guilty.

*Communists Campaign in Rural Areas

954F2082B Moscow KRESTYANSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 13, 10-16 Apr 95 p 2

[Article by Yuriy Dyukarev: "Communists Go to the Village"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With unprecedented power and confidence, Gennadiy Zyuganov's 550,000-man army of communists has been marching toward the upcoming elections to parliament and of the president. And, we must admit, according to most public opinion polls, the voters, especially those in rural areas, are giving the communist party first place. Among the supporters of the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] there are many peasants. And the communists are giving a mutual response to the peasants. The peasantry today "has shown itself on the whole to be the most organized force," Gennadiy Zyuganov recently stated in Moscow. "The extremes of patriarchy, as well as of modernism, are foreign to it. And the experiments which are being conducted with agriculture and with the farm are being perceived by the peasants specifically in the plane of unceasing radical modernization."

The communists do not tire of repeating that they certainly do not oppose small-scale peasant family-type

production. "It is not socialism which threatens the individual peasant farms," stated Zyuganov, "but capitalization." In his words, in 1992 around 5,000 farmers went bankrupt, in 1993—14,000, and in 1994—already 28,000. The peasant farms which had maintained close ties with the kolkhozes [collective farms] and the sovkhozes [state farms], and which had begun to unite into cooperatives, turned out to be the most stable.

In recent times, communists have begun to actively utilize the slogans taken from Mikhail Lapshin's Agrarian Party of Russia: On the threat to Russia's food security, on the disintegration of the rural economy, on a two-time reduction in the livestock raising potential, on the government's unpatriotic support of foreign agricultural producers, and on the unpreparedness of our peasants for the planting and the danger of being left without a harvest.

***Anpilov Joins Communist Union**

954F2058B Moscow ZAVTRA in Russian No 13, Mar 95 p 2

[Report on Joint Plenum of UCP-CPSU Council on 25 March 1995]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sixth Joint Plenum of the UCP-CPSU Council was held at "Leninskiye Gorki" on 25 March 1995. Speeches by UCP-CPSU Council Chairman O.S. Shenin and Deputy Chairman Ye.K. Ligachev and several reports were presented at the plenum.

The plenum accepted the Russian Communist Workers Party as a full member of the UCP-CPSU and the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Party of Communists as associate members. The plenum decreed that the 30th UCP-CPSU Congress would be held in July 1995 and established the procedure for electing delegates to the congress: one delegate for every 4,000 Communists and 10 delegates from each party and movement with fewer than 40,000 Communist members.

The plenum requested all of the Communist members of the CPSU within the territory of the Russian Federation to strengthen the unity of the Communist movement and become members of existing communist parties belonging to the UCP-CPSU (the CPRF, the RCWP, and the UC).

The plenum resolutely probed the activities of the organizing committee in convening the All-Russian Conference of CPSU Members and creating another Russian Communist Party of the CPSU (RCP-CPSU).

The plenum recommended that communist parties make a greater effort to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts and to defend political prisoners in Latvia and Lithuania.

***Communists Debate Election Tactics**

954F1915A Moscow PRAVDA ROSSII in Russian 23 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by M. Mashkovtsev, chairman of the Kamchatka Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation: "When Losing Is Better Than Winning"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Such an issue was not on the agenda during the congress of the KPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation], but the delegates could not escape it. It was discussed quite keenly at the meeting of first secretaries of oblast committees held prior to the congress. It was also touched on in speeches of the delegates at the congress. Some heated debates were going on behind the scenes as well. There was really something to argue about: how to prepare for elections. More concretely, who will the communists support and campaign for.

"We must nominate the leader of our party as candidate for president," is the view of most of the congress participants. I will stress that the absolute majority of communists of Kamchatka think the same way. That was revealed in party meetings at all primary organizations.

"We must not do this under any circumstances," was the other answer to the same question.

Inasmuch as I subscribe to the first viewpoint, I will attempt to substantiate it and dispute the arguments set forth by supporters of the second position. What are the objections being raised by my opponents?

The first and main one: the communists have little chance of winning; individually, no chance at all! This is the extreme viewpoint. That means it is necessary to nominate the candidate of a bloc of allies.

Who can become the candidate of a unified opposition bloc? Only our party does not consider the victory of its leader a goal in itself. The interests of the cause are greater than his personal victory, only to our leader. All the others, at any rate the best known opposition leaders, regard specifically personal victory as the main goal. Those who so far do not have their own parties and are urgently creating them are preparing their followers for that task, and some are attempting to join the KPRF in the hope of working their way to the presidential seat on our shoulders. None of them would voluntarily relinquish their candidate's spot. This means that if we set the goal of creating a unified bloc we will be the ones who will have to step aside.

What is so bad about that?

The fact is that a single "pink centrist with a leftist tilt" becoming the president will not dare to implement communist measures to resolve the crisis, the most important ones being restoring government monopoly in foreign trade, nationalizing commercial banks, and returning heavy industry to state ownership (remember

Lenin's first decrees¹). Consequently the election winner will have to "deepen market reforms." Examples are evident to all.

Far be it for me to think that Leonid Kuchma consciously lied to the Ukrainian voters and was prepared from the start to disregard his promises. I am, however, absolutely convinced that the Belarusian "almost Communist" Lukashenko never even dreamed of any deception. Both, however, had the same results. Facing the need to take decisive anti-crisis measures and not wishing to follow the Communist path, they got themselves wedged deeper in the "stranglehold" of the IMF. The same will inevitably be done by our coalition president as well.

Nominating our own communist candidate we will inevitably lose, say the supporters of a "coalition." That is not so unavoidable, I must note. Hearing that, my opponents fall into a state of "holy terror."

What? Prolong the country's destruction for another five years?

Yes. What else can be done? Destruction will continue anyway, whether power is acquired by Gaydar, Zhirinovskiy, Yavlinskiy, Fedorov, or "a coalition centrist" (even if the latter is supported by the Communists). If that centrist comes to power with our help, people will hold us responsible. "We believed you and voted as you wished." Then in another five years our chances of winning will be equal to zero! Let the next president come to power in opposition to us, having won over our candidate. In the second round of voting we can support him in a struggle against Zhirinovskiy or Yavlinskiy, but as the lesser of two evils. We will have an invulnerable moral position and a powerful propaganda trump card. Then in five years we will be assured of victory.

There is another argument used by supporters of a "coalition." The country is purportedly mired in such a swamp that it is impossible to pull it out without becoming covered up to one's ears in mud. Strict and unpopular measures will be needed. Therefore, they say, let the centrist get dirty; we will arrive in five years to do some clean work.

I shall repeat once more: if a centrist comes to power with our help we will not remain clean. More than that, utilizing his presidential position he will attempt to shovel most of the dirt specifically over on the Communists. We must do the dirty work ourselves. We must do it to completion and enter the path leading to an improvement in the quality of life in the course of a single presidential term!

Therefore I disagree with another widespread opinion:

As soon as a Communist candidate wins, he must restore the Soviets by Edict No. 1 and liquidate his own position with Edict No. 2.

That will not work! What if the Soviets turn out to be constitutional democratic or Menshevik? That is certainly the way it will be! Everything will then start over again?

Unlimited presidential power destroyed the country. Only it is capable of bringing it out of ruin within a short period. Do not forget: victory in the civil war and restoration of the economy were achieved thanks to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and a very severe one, I dare recall. We must accomplish the same within one term. By the end of that term it will be necessary to prepare and adopt a new Soviet socialist constitution. It will not provide for the post of a president. That is the real task of the first and last Communist president of Russia.

My thoughts are undoubtedly nothing new. More than that, this is what is believed by many rank and file Communists and our non-party supporters. I hope that this position will be adopted by the party as a whole. There is very little time left for deliberations.

Article Views Congruence of Communist, Agrarian Interests

954E0821A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
4 Apr 95 p 1

[Article by Feliks Babitskiy under "Positions" rubric: "For Whom Does the Expression 'Communo-Agrarians' Grate Upon the Ears?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As each new party is formed, Russian politicians are faced with the question of which "construction material" to use. With today's ideological confusion and wavering, it is very difficult to rouse even three like-thinkers to walk in step together. This is why almost all the parties, and of course, all the larger ones, prefer to recruit not just citizens but already prepared organizations for membership. Of course, the classic example is Zyuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation [KPRF], which inherited the organizational structure of the CPSU, but it is in no way the exception. In its time, when many people were still taking Volkskiy and his "industrial party" seriously, one of his advisors—certainly not the stupidest—proposed that he use the appropriate councils as "primary cells" and regional divisions. Politicians, however, have pinned their greatest hopes on the trade unions.

Everyone, including the left-wing parties, have made attempts to bring them into politics. An attempt was even made by the FNPS [Federation of Independent Trade Unions] leadership and the Moscow Federation of Trade Unions to inspire the creation of their own Labor Party as a counterweight to these attempts. It did not work out, mainly because regional and branch trade union leaders have too much autonomy from the "crooked house." It is exactly the latter that has made possible the greatest degree of success in party-building.

This occurred on the threshold of the last parliamentary elections, when the Agrarian Party of Russia arose from the built-upon Agropromprofsoyuz [Agro-Industrial Trade Union] and with ideological aid from the Agrarian Union faction of the dissolved Supreme Soviet and the support of highly placed Ministry of Agriculture officials.

It should be said that even in the old parliament, the agrarians had a significant representation and still greater influence. Not a single resolution could pass the plenum without their approval. This is why by the time the smoke over the "White House" had cleared, the agrarian lobby was already prepared for a new stage of operations: the creation of its own party. Its ranks were greatly strengthened by the communists, for whom running for Duma along with Zyuganov's people didn't work out, either for moral or some other reasons, or just because they hadn't been given "honorable numbers" in his party list. So, for example, one of the former leaders of the liberal communist SPT [Socialist Labor Party] became an agrarian, as did Ivan Rybkin, the current speaker, or Vladimir Isakov, a convinced communist. The party, however, clearly had no need for "wedding generals;" its leader became Mikhail Lapshin, leader of the Agrarian Union.

It should be said that while in the number of ministerial portfolios that it controls the Agrarian Party of Russia [APR] yields slightly to two other parties—PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] and Russia's Choice—it is the APR that most harmoniously combines all forms of political lobbying. The APR has a massive membership base; its own trade union, the largest in the country; a Duma faction, fourth in number; and finally, a representative in the government, Minister of Agriculture Nazarchuk (Deputy Prime Minister Zaveryukha is also considered a party protege, which is true, albeit with certain reservations).

The agrarians' ideological positions often coincide with Zyuganov's, which is clear from the results of a name vote on a majority of issues. The KPRF and the APR frequently form blocs, yet the expression "communo-agrarian" obviously grates on the ears of Mr. Lapshin and his associates. There are several reasons for this. First, the party was created originally as a part of a powerful branch lobby, for whom it made sense to protect its well-won place in the sun, but it was entirely unnecessary to push for complete power. Second, communist party demarches simply shock many APR leaders as extremist. Third, as one classic has said, "we all look toward Napoleons," and as another so reasonably noted, "Bolivar won't survive two." In other words, the APR has become a kind of refuge for unfulfilled Russian Communist Party leaders who are correspondingly lacking in warm feelings for the fulfilled leaders.

It looks as if Agropromprofsoyuz' successful experience has inspired its colleagues from Rosugleprof [Russian Coal Trade Union]. In anticipation of the new elections,

the leadership of this extremely politically active trade union (almost without the approval of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy) has also taken up party-building. Here, the structure of the APR is being copied almost entirely. Such imitation gives rise to an interesting thought: a party that is part of a multi-level branch lobby is the most stable and viable. Maybe this is the general line of evolution for our entire multiparty system. I think that it is up to the coming elections to either confirm or refute this.

Claims of 'National Security Concept' Authors Cited, Refuted

954E0821B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
4 Apr 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Aleksey Surkov: "Dangerous for Democracy: National Security in Pre-Election Packaging"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Frightened by the sweep of the early stages of the "race" for votes from the electorate, the Central Election Commission [TsIK] has been forced to make a special statement in the press reminding everyone that according to the law "On the Fundamental Guarantees of Election Rights for Citizens of the Russian Federation," election agitation "begins from the day of the candidates' registration and ends one day before election day." In other words, the commission has called upon future seekers of the people's trust to observe the law and wait until the pre-election campaign is officially given the green light.

As if in defiance of the TsIK, however, party leaders have not left the television screens; they have in fact begun their individual pre-election marathon. It is strange that many TV stations, like in Chechnya, consider themselves exempt from observing the Russian laws and do not even try to restrain broadcast participants who are openly violating election laws. Evidently, they are waiting for a special statement from the TsIK about them or a decision from the Judicial Chamber on informational disputes concerning the president of Russia.

For the sake of justice, however, it should be noted that the drive for votes is not limited to television self-advertising.

For example, the Russian National Union radical-nationalist organization announced the beginning of its pre-election campaign at a meeting in Moscow's Komsolets movie theater.

Recently, Muscovites have found flyers in their mailboxes with the recipe for a "Masha" cake. It would seem that one should be happy for the home delivery of free advice from specialists, but it turns out that the flyer is the essence of the party's pre-election advertising, to which the copyright bears witness: "a recipe from the RF Republican Party," and under that is the leader's signature: "Vladimir Lysenko, RF State Duma deputy, chairman of the Republic Party of Russia." Amusing and resourceful, but premature.

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When political interest becomes a group interest, then you cannot get by any more without a recipe. The people must be given something monumental with the mandatory vague headline. A graphic little example of this is the "National Security Concept for Russia in 1995." The 200-page work in its bright red finery was issued by the RAU Corporation joint-stock company. The list of authors includes 100 people, all with familiar faces: Baburin and Zyuganov, Tuleyev and Aushev, Glazyev and Ilyumzhinov, Ilyukhin, Stolyarov, Lipitskiy, etc.

Before you plunge into the essence of the fusion of group thinking, you involuntarily stumble upon the name of the book: "National Security Concept 'in 1995!'" The question occurs to you: does that mean there will be no need for national security in 1996 and all the years following? Or will we develop a special model for state security for each year? If one considers when the book was published (March!), then the concept is calculated only for the remaining portion of the year; that is, for nine months. You immediately realize that something else is concealed behind the intrigue of the title and that security here has been given the role of a smoke screen. Wherein lies the point of the collective product?

The text of the concept is anticipated by an article saturated with national, patriotic spirit, written by Academic A. I. Podberezkin, RAU Corporation president. Criticizing the reforms and reformers, observing in passing the various positive suits of the president's message ("an attempt to formulate a strategy for state development based on a national idea," "the unconditionally positive accents in the part concerning state support of research-intensive production, domestic culture, and science"), the academic emphasizes: "A great world power is at a historical crossroads. There is no way back, but its final choice of a new road lies ahead." Only when, where, and how the long-awaited "final choice" of a Russian way—through referendum, party congress, or state coup—will take place, the scholar does not specify. Having accused the "reformers," who, it turns out, have "step by step (!) destroyed any evidence of statehood and patriotism, feelings of pride or national worth," the scholar laments that "the Russian idea is still only in the formative stage." The "distinctive way of development for Russian statehood, which has no analogy in world history" in his opinion, is all the same experiencing a rebirth. Well, thanks for that! At least something hopeful has been noticed in this life. But then there are all those liberal-democratic models of state-building—like all the others, including the Chinese—that the academic won't have anything to do with. It would be interesting to know exactly where its co-authors are planning to send Russia by stipulating in the concept a "strengthening of state regulatory methods in providing for an effective and smooth transition to a market economy" (page 67)? Is this not from the Chinese model, the slow-moving version used since 1978 by the party to send it to nowhere? True, it was with market symbolism in the form of individually selected regional "lighthouses"—free economic zones, as was also prescribed under socialism—

but that did not touch the majority of the population. Further, Mr. Podberezkin sums up: only a "strong state power is capable of restraining anarchic searches for truth to an evolutionary course under conditions of a peaceful, varied, and multi-plan country," since, as he says, "the Russian people are historically loyal to the idea of the state." Quite a debatable addition to the original thesis! We saw how strong the communist state was, with its gulags, missiles, and atom bombs. All the same, the people rejected it. Evidently, man does not live by loyalty to a state idea alone!

The national, patriotic spirit of the foreword is broadly ladled over the entire contents, overflowing with phraseology about national interests, national security, the national idea ("the historically continuing interests of the Russian people demand," "the historical territory of the Russian state is comprised unalterably of the vitally important interests of the Russian people and of other peoples of the area"). Alternating with "accusatory" statistics and facts concerning "shock-therapy" reforms, the text abounds with statements of the obvious:

"The Soviet Union, as a state, is already the property of history," "we need national unity and accord," "for many years, our country has not experienced any kind of significant foreign military threat," "it is in our interests, working jointly with others, to take the path of the deepest possible decrease in weapons and armed forces, orienting ourselves toward the principle of what is sufficient for defense," "it is in our interest to extinguish all inter-ethnic conflicts along the Caucasus and southern borders, to attain peace and quiet there," "the creation of a solid legislative base is the first-priority task in the war against crime in Russia and in consolidating the country's national security," "in itself, inflation does not represent an unavoidable evil for the economy...the question is not how to suppress inflation but how to restrain it to a minimum, to learn how to use it to influence production, technological progress and structural reorganizations..."

There are many completely accurate statements, but so what? Especially since many of these propositions are the subject of ongoing work by the presidential apparatus, government structures, ministries, departments, local administration, representative organs at all levels. Maybe it was written to dull the alertness of the trusting reader, to force him to think that today even the obvious is being neglected, but that when the patriotic opposition comes to power... For some politicians, this kind of pre-election ambiguity is self-advertising. Let us recall the pre-election, broadly distributed promises of Mr. Zhirinovskiy or the firm assertions made by Mr. Mavrodi that captivated Russia in their time, that they would return money to deceived stock-holders. When push came to shove, they were just soap bubbles. So is it morally right for seekers of the people's trust to hold potential voters on a leash of disinformation?

It is hard not to agree with the authors when they write about the necessity of adopting decisive measures "for

the use of unverified information that causes damage to the state and the civic peace." After the one-sided illumination of the events in Chechnya provided by deputies and journalists in the mass media, society needs legislative guarantees of trustworthy information. There are more than a few State Duma deputies among the authors. They have legislative initiative. Instead of writing a populist work, it would have been better to have developed a draft law on liability for untrustworthy information and to have introduced it for deliberation to the State Duma. Honorable sirs, use the powers granted to you in the interests of your electorate, and then you won't have to bluff in the pre-election campaign!

I think that the people who have decided to deal with the present concept will, with unfeigned surprise, read the sincere indignation of solid men as the penetration into our life of "foreign" words: "president," "presentation," "summit," "broker," "briefing," "manager," "mentality," which, they may say, "have excluded existing concepts in our language" (page 57). Indeed, having destroyed the "iron curtain" of the ideological state, we find ourselves face to face with countries and peoples living in a different scientific-technical dimension. Now we, like the cave-dwellers, must master the rudiments of a formerly inaccessible form of communication, and no matter how much we have been trying to cloud the minds of the population about a special Russian path, we won't find a Russian equivalent for the word "computer." On the wave of pre-election populism, are the authors prepared to give up, for example, computers so that they can sit at typewriters so they can switch over to "our" accounting calculations?!

The better you get to know the text of the concept, the more convinced you become that the people writing it were not concerned about the country's national security but about coming up with pre-election postulates. Here, they are aiming at people who in their youth had Magnitka, Metrostroy, or Dnepetroges. People without rights, having nothing, stupefied by decades of state ideology, even now preserve within themselves their dislike of what was cultivated for many years as a "bourgeois inclination," especially if it concerns questions of land ownership. In their opinion, even now it would be better for the land, belonging to nobody and ownerless, to revert to swamp, to be destroyed by erosion, to become overgrown with weeds than to pass into the husbanding hands of the same villager based on property rights. Yesterday, kolkhoz and sovkhoz party committee workers frightened them with bourgeois land practices. Today, Zyuganov communists, along with Lapshin's agrarians, are more than making up for it. Free peasant labor scares red landowners! It is much easier to exploit the indigent kolkhoznik for pitiful groshi in one's own interests. That is why the new peasant glad-handers from the agrarians' party orate, foaming at the mouth, against the purchase and sale of land. They want very much to extend slave-ownership in Russian fields. This is why they speak out against land reform, writing their hackneyed conclusions in the concept:

- "reform of the agrarian sector of the economy based on private ownership of land under today's conditions has poor economic prospects and cannot raise the sector to a civilized level;
- "the currently active legislation dealing with private land ownership, its purchase and sale...will lead to the collapse of the Russian state because there are republics and regions that do not recognize this reform;
- "private land ownership and its purchase and sale are foreign to society's historical nature and to the national consciousness of the Russian peasant."

Here you have it then, villagers, St. George's Day; now there's hope for a new party order in the village! You didn't have land under the communists, and you won't see it under the agrarian party either, if you bring them to power.

On almost every page of the book, you can see an attempt to show the reader the great concern that the work's writers bear for national interests. One might think that it was they who should be the first to welcome the tendency hinted at in the country toward cutting back the extraction of oil and gas, decreasing the drilling of new wells, and ending the development of new deposits. There has been enough mindless waste of irreplaceable national resources. It is time to think about later generations. After all, we cannot, as occurred under Soviet power, arbitrarily squander national property, transforming Russia into a raw material annex for developed countries! Not in words but in deeds the government, local administrations, and reformers are bringing order to domestic mismanagement step by step. Customs and currency control are being strengthened, and many banks and self-serving businessmen are beginning to feel not entirely free. It did not feel right for some people, and the earlier dispersed broad privileges have been annulled. Work is going forward to simplify the taxation and banking systems, together with consolidation of tax discipline. In other words, real measures for restraining the economy in favor of the national interest are being taken. It is here that the cut in resource development originates, including cuts in oil and gas extraction, but here, as well, the opposition distorts everything. On the whole, in the text, this positive process becomes the next thing to a national catastrophe. But why? Maybe the old party committee double standard won't leave them alone: we say one thing from the tribune, but when necessary we tell the people exactly the opposite! Here the authors do not consider the fact that we are already living in a different Russia, not the communist one, and the understanding that most of the people have of the modernizing processes that are taking place is not one from the days of party committees. People have learned to recognize demagoguery.

It would be difficult to call the following opinion anything other than demagoguery: "...the absence of international agreements on territorial waters and economic zones in the Caspian Sea could create a new hotbed of

military tension." People who don't know the problems of the Caspian will think the authors are making a wise insight, and they will be incorrect. In writing this thesis, they are evidently unaware that the negotiations process concerning the Caspian has been under way, with the participation of all the Caspian states, for over a year. As we know, in accordance with Soviet-Iranian treaties (of 26 February 1921 and 25 March 1940), as well as currently existing norms of international law, the Caspian is a closed body of water. For this reason, the procedure for its utilization is not regulated by norms of international law concerning the legal regime to be followed for a territorial sea, for an exceptional economic zone, for the continental shelf. It is determined by agreements between the coastal states, and work in this area is proceeding with difficulty. After all, if before the Caspian had two owners (the USSR and Iran), now there are five: Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Azerbaijan. Each has its own interest. Russia has developed and introduced for deliberation by the Caspian states a draft Agreement on the Conservation and Utilization of the Bioresources of the Caspian Sea. Iran, in cooperation with other Caspian states, has prepared a draft Treaty on Regional Cooperation in the Caspian Sea. The process of coordinating the positions of the various sides continues. In a word, the Caspian problem has not been forgotten, as the text of the concept might lead one to believe.

No less strange is the record cited in the book stating the need for Russia and China to comply with the resolutions of the Yalta conference on the Far East, specifically the portion concerning "confirmation...of the Kuril Islands' affiliation with Russia" (page 36). The Yalta agreements between the victorious countries on territorial questions did not demand mandatory execution. They were agreements on intentions, taking into consideration the desires that had been expressed. After the end of the war, these agreements were rethought, given concrete form, and invested in a specific act of international law: a peace treaty that was signed by 49 states at a peace conference in San Francisco in 1951. The USSR did not sign that peace treaty. In this manner, for the USSR the "Yalta agreements" on the Kurils remain merely good intentions.

The authors should also specify what sort of "Kuril Islands affiliation with Russia" they are speaking of. At the time of the "Khasbulatov" Supreme Soviet, the opposition tried several times, with the aid of meetings (Democrats are selling the Motherland! Not an inch of Russian land!), to falsify the truth about the Russian-Japanese territorial problem. I am also a son of my fatherland, but I am a jurist, and for this reason, in discussions I prefer to attack the problem from a legal perspective. Briefly, this is the history of the Kurils: the Kuril ridge is a chain of islands stretching from the southern end of Kamchatka to the northern part of Japan—Khokkaido. According to the Russian-Japanese treaty on trade and friendship (1855), the northern part of the Kuril ridge (18 islands) went to Russia, while the

southern portion, with the islands Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and a group of small islands—Khabomai—went to Japan. Sakhalin Island was for joint use. Twenty years later (in 1885), the parties agreed to alter the earlier achieved agreement and concluded a Treaty that exchanged Sakhalin for the Kuril Islands belonging to Russia. Since then, Sakhalin Island belonged entirely to Russia, while the entire Kuril ridge was transferred to Japan.

The years 1904-1905: defeat in the Russian-Japanese War forced Russia to accept the one-sided conditions of the victorious country and to sign the Portsmouth Peace Treaty (September 5, 1905), according to which South Sakhalin was given to Japan.

May 1945. The war with Germany is over. August. Japan declares its full capitulation. At this time (August 25 to 29, 1945), Soviet sea forces have occupied the northern portion of the Kuril ridge that formerly belonged to Russia (all 18 islands). Several days later, the southern islands belonging to Japan were also occupied. This situation has continued until now.

To which portion of the Kuril ridge is the concept referring? Incidentally, one must give the Japanese side its due for the wisdom it showed in insisting on the return of only the four southern islands. Realizing the obvious correctness of the demands, back in 1956 the Soviet side began to take reciprocal steps. At that time, the USSR Supreme Soviet ratified a declaration concluded between the USSR and Japan that transferred the islands of Shikotan and Khabomai to Japan. Regarding the two others—Iturup and Kunashir—the two sides agreed that they would begin negotiations after the conclusion of a bilateral peace treaty.

Alas! The USSR did not carry out the declaration. It did not return the two promised islands to Japan. It did not conclude the peace treaty. Now, fate has offered our generation a chance to resolve this excessively protracted question: how long will this state of neither war nor peace continue between the Russian and Japanese peoples? Is this not why the authors were quick to include with their medium-urgency interests "reaching an agreement acceptable for Russia regulating the question of the southern islands of the Kuril ridge, in order to remove the barrier to developing cooperative relations with Japan?" This intention is praiseworthy, although it lacks originality. It is sufficient to recall the appeal to the president, the government, and the Federal Assembly, published on 26 January of this year in KURANTY, made by M. Zakharov, T. Kuzovlevaya, A. Ivanov, N. Fateyeva, V. Ostkotskiy, and other well-known representatives of the Moscow intelligentsia, who, after the destructive earthquake in Japan, requested that all branches of government accelerate resolution of the South Kuril problem. "If you don't want to give them up 'just because,'" they wrote, "you can conclude an inter-governmental treaty on joint ownership, let's say, for 49 years, after which the disputed islands would pass

entirely to Japan." B. N. Yeltsin and many democrats have suggested an analogous gradual approach to resolving the problem numerous times. In response, oppositionists have aroused the people, crying betrayal of national interests. Now they have come to the same conclusion on their own. What has caused such an acute transformation in their position? If it comes from the heart, then why aren't the signers of the concept posing the question of the fate of the Southern Kurils in the Federal Assembly today? After all, it is our neighboring peoples who stand to win from the resolution of this problem of territorial demarcation that we have inherited. Perhaps, as has happened more than once, the statement is no more than pre-election nonsense?!

In any case, after reading this work you become decisively convinced that what is in fact an ideological bomb for immediate action has been published under the guise of national security, the fulfilling of which is a pre-election program for anti-reform forces. The authors' intention of restoring the Soviet system of parliamentary control over the executive branch—under which legislators would be unable to engage in law-making and the executive branch would be unable to perform its functions—ceases to amaze us. Some will be doing spot-checks using any excuse while others, called "on the carpet," will be busy writing explanatory letters, inquiries, and reports. It proposes that the experiment in all branch deputy supervision over the executive branch begin with the Ministry of Defense, for which the opposition has no great love. At the same time, it proposes to replace the tax system and pension legislation, to determine the competence and function of the Security Council, and to take many more radical steps that are cause for unfeigned surprise among specialists. All that is written is stuffed into the Main Anti-Reform Idea, which is also stated openly here:

"If we truly want a rebirth of Russia, the logic of the reforms must be principally different. The strategic course must be corrected."

There it is, the idea that has openly obsessed the opposition since the first Congress of People's Deputies! In order not to discourage shaky comrades-in-arms and other sympathizers, it provides for sweetened bait, in the form of obligations, to end income differentiation at once. How? Very simply. The author's device in the text explains: "to achieve greater rates of growth in income for workers and the population for whom indicators are low (in what way?—A. S.), and to slow the growth rates for those whose indicators are high." Look at the genius of this invention of the century! True, the same damned question remains unclear: how do the treatise's ideologues intend to translate this method into reality? Through socialist law or by using party volunteers? One gets the feeling that the bearers of the communist ideology will have no peace until they can perform another experiment on the people. Again, they are trying to drive society with the principle, rejected by life itself, of socialist equality, at the basis of which lies only equality in poverty.

Realizing how openly the political platform proposed in the concept fails to adopt the course of reforms, its developers decided to soften it using yet another device, concealing it behind national security. For example, in the concluding statement they throw in an absolutely artificial sentence on the necessity of developing a law on the Russian Federation's national security. First, what kind of law will it be if it is written according to a concept calculated for one year, not even the entire year 1995 at that? By the time the law is written, discussed, and adopted, the year will be over. Second—and I assume that this is not news for the authors of the group idea—the proposed law exists and is functioning. It was enacted on 5 March 1992 and is called the Law of the Russian Federation "On Security." Perhaps it is now slightly out of date in some ways or has become incomplete and needs supplements and amendments, but it does exist, Messrs. Conceptualists! And the principals of national security are stated in it, as are the functions of the Security Council, in compliance with which the currently existing Security Council operates. What is the point of all these clever dodges? Tell us directly, kind sirs, what you want, what you are always talking about at meetings, that you want to topple the "anti-national regime." This is why the communists and the agrarians refused to sign the Treaty on Public Cooperation. Whenever they get the chance, with or without reason, they moan about the reforms, the actions of the government, the president, and his message. You need shocks, Messrs! But why did you put national security on the title page of the concept if you are generally against national cooperation in society? Everybody knows what your principle has been for all these years: the worse things get in the country, the easier it is for you to stupefy the population. Every chance you get, you strive to make the situation worse. Do the people know that you place your own political ambitions first? You should be happy for now; your deception is successful, due to the trusting nature of the masses. The hour when people will unmask your complete lie and refuse their trust is near.

Yes, it is hard to give society reforms. It is difficult to plant the shoots of democracy in Russia's body, mutilated by totalitarianism. But there is also evidence of inroads made by hopeful young people. "We have the beginnings of a market economy," notes Vladimir Gulyev, doctor of juridical sciences, in his analysis of the 10-year course of restructuring. "We have the constitutionally formulated institutions of a pre-democratic political system. There is evidence of new economic creation and the movement of millions. Money, not Gosplan, runs the economy now... The country has opened itself to a world that no longer fears us. Citizens are free to come and go, but people, who have mastered freedom with amazing speed as an area for the criticism (or more frequently, simply abuse) of the authorities, relinquish the swaddling clothes of dependence only with difficulty. It is not just old people attending 'red meetings,' but stalwart good-for-nothings as well, who

don't want to work for a living but would rather just take." Yes, perhaps this is the way things are!

For now, it is spring outside—the fifth spring of the Russian democracy. Slowly but surely, signs of the Russian state's coming of age are starting to appear, and man's faith in the creative process has matured.

But Russians, just don't let yourself get caught with the chaff of pre-election nonsense!

***MVD Anti-Mafia Chief Interviewed**

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[Interview with Major General Aleksandr Dementyev, deputy chief of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs Main Directorate on Organized Crime, by Nikolay Modestov; place and date not given: "Is the Thief Not Triable? Organized Crime Exists, but According to the Law, It Seems It Does Not"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During the last year, 2.632 million crimes were registered in Russia. More than 80 percent of them fall within the jurisdiction of the crime militia. The number of crimes against persons increased, including premeditated murders and grave physical injuries. There were more economic and official crimes. What is most alarming is that the number of group crimes has increased by 22.1 percent (476,900 persons were exposed in the solved criminal cases alone). The crime-solving indices are not dazzling. Although 1.578 million criminals (13.2 percent more than in 1993) appeared before the law, the exposure of murders and the total number of solved crimes within the scope of the crime militia decreased. Are these negative trends associated with the continuously increasing organized nature of the criminal associations? We addressed this question to Major General Aleksandr Dementyev, deputy chief of the Main Directorate on Organized Crime of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Russia.

"Unquestionably, organized crime is having more and more influence on the state of law and order," says Aleksandr Semenovich. "It has permeated many spheres of public life, and it has an effect not only on local political and economic processes, but it actively influences the course of reforms being conducted in the country."

[Modestov] What regions of Russia are regarded as the most difficult?

[Dementyev] Those hit most by organized crime are the Chechen Republic, the Moscow and central regions, the cities of Vladivostok, Nakhodka, and Petrovsk-Zabaykalskiy, Kemerovo Oblast, St. Petersburg, Vorkuta, Kazan, Tolyatti, and Saratov, and also Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Tuapse, and Mineralnyye Vody. Twelve regional and 75 republican, kray, and oblast administrations and branches and, in addition, their sections and groups in 144 cities with a difficult

operational situation, are oriented on the struggle against organized crime. The special quick reaction subunits that operate in this structure have assumed the functions of suppressing the activity of armed criminal groups and confiscating arms, ammunition, explosives, and narcotics.

Previously, any solved crime was considered a positive result. In 1994 we concentrated forces on the exposure of crimes committed by organized groups, leaders, and crime bosses. This made it possible to deliver serious blows against the mafia formations in a number of criminogenic regions of Russia. Together with other services of the MVD, our subunits participated in the large-scale all-Russian operations Putina-94, Elbrus, Koltso-1, Tayfun, Signal, Mak-94, and Tranzit. As a result, thousands of crimes were solved, and hundreds of illegal arms, explosive devices and substances, ammunition, narcotics, strategic raw materials were confiscated....

[Modestov] Is it possible to talk in more detail about some of the operations?

[Dementyev] A special-purpose operation conducted simultaneously in three cities of the North Caucasus region—Krasnodar, Novorossiysk, and Tuapse—can be considered a typical example. Two hundred and fifty-eight crimes were solved, 48 criminals were arrested, and about 100 guns, grenades, mine detectors, night vision devices, and 20 stolen automobiles were confiscated. In addition, the theft of 2 billion rubles [R] from the Central Bank system, which residents of Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Krasnodar tried to organize with the help of forged letters of advice, was prevented.

In Tyumen 60 of the most active members of the criminal group of the local "authority," Kozhukov, were arrested. Assault rifles, sawed-off shotguns, revolvers, grenades, and part of the thieves' common fund were confiscated. A special quick reaction detachment of the RUOP [Regional Organized Crime Administration] of the central region participated in hundreds of operations. In Reutov a criminal group of the dangerous criminal Shesterikov, who escaped from a solitary confinement cell, was detained. During the operation a SOBR [Special Quick Reaction Detachment] employee, Vladimirov, died from a bullet wound in the head.... Alas, gangsters are becoming more and more aggressive and merciless, and they are the first to open fire to kill without hesitation.

It is easy to judge the cynicism of criminals from cases like this. In Samara Oblast the SOBR of the local UOP [Organized Crime Administration] disarmed a terrorist who had taken two children as hostages. In Rostov Oblast our employees captured a criminal who took two four-year-old children and a kindergarten teacher as hostages. Moreover, the gangster threatened to explode a homemade bomb, if his demands were not met. It is typical that in neither case did any of the captives suffer.

Our employees in these critical situations acted in an irreproachable professional manner.

[Modestov] You spoke about the concentration of the activity of subunits fighting organized crime in a campaign against the leaders of groups and crime bosses. But what do the results of this campaign look like in figures?

[Dementyev] In the last year, criminal charges were brought against 15,197 members of mafia groups. Including 1,793 "authorities" and 40 crime bosses. In addition, 13,808 individual firearms, R137.9 billion, \$31.6 million, and 1,525 cars were confiscated. Nineteen thousand, three hundred and ninety-nine crimes were solved, including 253 murders that were committed by members of groups, about 48 percent more than in 1993.

According to our calculations, 8,059 criminal groups, with the number of members at 35,348 persons, were counted in Russia. Every fourth criminal organization has corrupt ties and spends 30 to 40 percent of its income on bribes of officials. More than 400 groups have intercity ties, and 1,200, interregional ties.

Such very diligent attention to crime bosses is not accidental. They are dangerous in that they develop a common criminal policy, and they coordinate and direct the operations of mafia gangs and the monetary resources of their common fund. According to data of the Main Information Center of the MVD of Russia, 740 crime bosses are on the books, 380 of these operate on the territory of Russia, and 53 reside in Moscow and operate in contact with the leaders of local criminal groups.

The latter frequently take the citizenship of other states and go abroad. This hinders their arrest and the institution of criminal charges. Being outside the borders of the CIS, crime bosses and "authorities" continue to direct criminal groups from there, and they establish joint firms for the legalization of criminal income. An example of this kind of "laundering" of monetary resources is the investment of capital by the leader of the Solntsevskiy group in the construction of a hotel in Budapest. But, despite these difficulties, the "jailhouse lawyers" are arrested by our services and incur the deserved punishment. In Bashkortostan, criminal charges were instituted against crime boss Asyanov. A Margolin pistol and a Belgian pistol with ammunition were confiscated from him. Crime boss Timurgaliyev, who escaped from Collective Labor Colony 25 in Bratsk, and his accomplice in the escape, Vasilyev, who is an especially dangerous hard-core criminal, were arrested. In Tambov Oblast criminal proceedings were instigated against 18 "authorities," including crime bosses Krylov and Chernikov.

The MVD of the Republic of Tatarstan arrested the "jailhouse lawyer" Illarionov, and in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast—two crime bosses. On the whole in Russia, in 1994 criminal proceedings were instigated against dozens of crime bosses for committing various crimes,

and of these, 28 were arrested in Moscow by subunits of the GUVd [Main Directorate of Internal Affairs], and 20 were arrested under material of the RUOP GUVd of Moscow. Unfortunately, not all of the crime bosses who were under investigation receive punishment. At the present time in Moscow, only eight of them have been sentenced to various prison terms.

[Modestov] You mentioned the coordination of operations by the "authorities" of their vassals in the criminal environment. How does this happen?

[Dementyev] Last year 413 thieves' meetings were held on the territory of Russia, at which the division of spheres of influence was discussed, conflict situations were resolved, and new bosses were "crowned." Five thousand, nine hundred and eighteen persons participated in the mob meeting. A majority of the gatherings were held in large cities and also in resort localities. For the purposes of security, the meetings were masked as weddings, anniversaries, or birthdays.

An operation was conducted in Perm Oblast to neutralize the meetings that were organized by crime boss Zykov, whose nickname is "the Yakut Kid." As a result, 215 persons were arrested, including seven crime bosses and "authorities" from the criminal environment of 15 cities of Russia; five of the criminals were under investigation, including one who was suspected of murder. Firearms and narcotics were confiscated. In Sverdlovsk Oblast, participants were arrested at a meeting held for the purpose of freeing yet another boss—Trofy—from prison. Firearms, 208 items of ammunition of various calibers, gas weapons, and 116 grams of marijuana were confiscated.

[Modestov] It seems that the criminal world has assimilated the ethics of diplomatic relations, or are disputes resolved by other than peaceful means?

[Dementyev] Our task is to prevent bloodshed, or "showdowns," as the criminals themselves call such arguments. But, of course, we cannot always prevent exchanges of fire between hostile sides. Last year, there were 183 armed clashes, during which 156 persons were killed and 104 were wounded. For comparison: There were 281 armed conflicts in 1993, and 534 persons were killed and wounded.

[Modestov] How serious is the connection of the native mafiosi with their "colleagues" in the near and far abroad?

[Dementyev] Crimes where transnational interests are being followed are becoming more and more widespread. The most prevalent among them are illegal entry into Russia, counterfeiting, forging or illegal acquisition of foreign passports and visas masked under various kinds of show-business trade in people, contraband, arms, narcotics, and raw material resources. There are illegal currency operations and trade in privatized apartments.

The expanded scale of activity of international criminal formations in many ways promotes a high level of corruption in customs and in other controlled foreign economic activity of the organs. The RUOP GUV of Moscow stopped the activity of two criminal groups, as a result of which the theft and export abroad of \$1.7 million was stopped. Residents of Russia, Switzerland, and Gibraltar were members of the groups. The activity of a transnational group whose members were citizens of the PRC and Portugal was stopped. Using forged passports, they engaged in taking foreigners through the state border of Russia to the countries of West Europe. There are many other examples.

The total sum of money illegally gained by the criminals of gangs in 1994 is assessed at approximately R1.759 billion.

[Modestov] Aleksandr Semenovich, last year saw the start of a new type of criminal activity, in any case, new for us. I have in mind extortion under the threat of cruel criminal terror.

[Dementyev] Such cases have been recorded. Perhaps the most notorious one was in Vladimir Oblast. There we disarmed a dangerous organized group that under the threat of poisoning the Vladimir water supply system with potassium cyanide demanded \$1 million from the city administration. All five of the criminals were arrested, and their participation in the commitment of other grave crimes is being looked into. The Adygea MVD directorate on organized crime arrested four active participants of a criminal group in Maykop, who extorted R500 million from the administration of the republic by threatening to blow up three establishments, including a children's polyclinic in the event of refusal. Homemade explosive devices were confiscated.

Crimes associated with the kidnapping of people for the purpose of extortion represent a special danger. With respect to the victims, the criminals frequently employ torture, torment, and the forced injections of psychotropic preparations. In the past year, 285 groups specialized in the committing of such crimes. Sixty-three kidnappings of people committed for the purpose of ransoms were solved. The RUOP of the Moscow region alone received 272 notices concerning the kidnapping of people for the purpose of receiving a ransom and the seizure of hostages, which is more than in 1993 by a factor of 3.5.

[Modestov] Last year there was talk for the first time about smuggling radioactive material. How serious is this threat?

[Dementyev] For the time being, such crimes are of an episodic nature. Thus, the UOP MVD of the Republic of Udmurtia stopped an attempt in Glazov to sell 94 kilograms of uranium that was stolen from the Chepetskiy Mechanical PO [production association] Plant. Three persons were arrested during the special operation, two of whom are workers of the Chepetskiy

Mechanical Plant. Three criminals who committed the theft of 150 kilograms of uranium and tried to sell it to representatives of commercial structures of the Baltics were sentenced to three and eight years of prison. The UOP UVD of Kaliningrad Oblast detained four persons who tried to sell a container with 30 kilograms of uranium-238 radioactive material for a million dollars. Three persons were arrested. In Kaluga and Moscow Oblasts, two members of a group were arrested from whom more than three kilograms of uranium-235 were confiscated that were stolen from the heavy machinebuilding plant in Elektrostal.

[Modestov] The enormous monetary resources acquired by the leaders of mafia clans are invested in business aggressively. You already mentioned the construction with the money of a hotel in Budapest by one of the leaders of the Solntsevskiy group. There probably are other examples?

[Dementyev] Criminals control a substantial number of enterprises of all forms of property. Firms that are controlled or owned by leaders of criminal groups are used for "laundering" money and the transfer of convertible currency to foreign banks. According to available data, 3,274 groups conduct "laundering" of criminally gained resources, 983 of which established legal commercial and production enterprises for these purposes. In Yekaterinburg an end was put to the activity of the firm Dzhoker, which is under the control of a "central" criminal organization, the firm ZLTD and the TOO [limited liability company] Start, which are controlled by the "Uralmash" criminal organization, the firms Miko-Invest and Sankirtan, which belong to a religious sect of Krishna-ites who are members of the criminal organization of "blues," and also the TOO Va-Bank of leader Tikhonov.

Last year a subunit of the RUOP of Moscow stopped the activity of 24 organized groups that had corrupt ties to state administration organs. For example, a group consisting of the chief of a militia station and the chief of REU [repair and maintenance administration], had ties to a criminal group that controlled Arbat Street and its surrounding territory. A group of plunderers consisting of officials of the Foreign Trade Bank of Russia had ties with the Solntsevskiy criminal group and corrupt employees of Internal Affairs organs.

[Modestov] Aleksandr Semenovich, the results of the activities of subunits fighting organized crime look convincing. And nevertheless, the number of law violations continues to grow, and criminal tension in society is increasing. What, in your opinion, hampers more effective work by the militia?

[Dementyev] First of all, we need an appropriate legislative base. After all, a law on organized crime has not been adopted yet, although the matter has now moved ahead a little. The same has to be said about the legalization of shady capital. We do not have such a law. Alas, there is not even a concept of this.

It is no secret that important criminal groups are associated with the activity of banks. Why are there so many crime bosses and "authorities" in the capital? It is not because Moscow is such a beautiful city. There are 900 banks here, and approximately 75 percent of all cash resources and colossal amounts of capital circulate here. It is for this reason that criminals are drawn here. But what kind of banking opportunities are there here? Deposits are secret. This idea is observed religiously in all countries. But nevertheless, we must have the right to inspect bank accounts without difficulty. Which, by the way, is also provided for in civilized states, in Germany, for example. And the bank is obligated to report to the competent organs about all suspicious movements in accounts. Without this, no matter how much we might fight and try, we would not succeed in improving the situation.

Until laws are adopted and put into effect, the situation will not change much. Do not forget that the militia and the law enforcement structures deal only with the consequences of economic processes that occur on a state scale. If we do not get away from shady capital, and if we do not destroy the economic basis of crime, only one thing is left for us to do—report on confiscated guns and arrested gangsters.

***Russia's 1991 Role in International Drug Syndicates Detailed**

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[Article by Artem Vetrov under the rubric "Investigations: Version": "The New Drug Lords"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *SEGODNYA* has already reported in a recent issue on Russia's successful cooperation with the world leaders in the drug business. The material in question mainly dealt with the penetration of the domestic market by traditional Western drugs and their producers. However, observers note that our compatriots have achieved no less (to be precise, much greater) success in the field of their own international and large-scale drug trafficking outside the country. Naturally, there is much less official information, verifiable through documents by law enforcement organs, on this subject. Next month in London the Center for Defense Studies of London University's King's College will sponsor a presentation of the book "Some Aspects of International Drug Syndicates' Activities in Our Times," written by specialists from the Moscow research group FELIX. This article is based on material from this book.

The editors attempted to verify the material presented by the FELIX group with experts on the drug business. In their opinion, it is impossible to validate with documents all the facts presented in the research, if for no other reason than because they are mainly based on operational (agent-collected) data. Nevertheless, the experts consider a considerable part of the material as true overall and

indirectly supported by other sources. Some of the information (especially in the international aspect), though, is simply a "tabula rasa" for Russian law enforcement organs.

According to available information, the FELIX group (official name: Special Department "F") is directly associated with the Russian special services. It was formed in February 1991 and manned by USSR GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces] and KGB personnel, with the task of investigating a score of crimes in the economic sphere. Since January 1994 the FELIX group's main spheres of interest have been international traffic in high-quality drugs (cocaine and heroin) and "money laundering." In addition, the group's interests include financial swindles in the banking system of the former USSR, the distribution of counterfeit foreign money, and criminal groups' (including international groups) connections with foreign special services and political structures of the former USSR. In February its experts prepared a white paper on the main international channels of drug transportation and drug groups operating in the immediate vicinity of Russia. As far as we know, this document has now been passed, in particular, to some Duma deputies. Let us note that official representatives of Russian special services neither confirmed nor denied the very fact of the FELIX group's existence.

Brothers in Arms and... Drugs

In the opinion of experts, the beginning of Russia's active entry into the international drug business system dates back to 1991, although the preconditions for it began to emerge even earlier. The pivotal point, however, was the disintegration of the USSR (and its law enforcement organs and special services) and the emergence on its territory of relatively free "criminal zones" in the Caucasus and the Baltics. In addition, the emergence of the "free republic" of Chechnya played an important role. It is these factors that predetermined a partial reorientation towards the north of the "Balkan route" of drug traffic, which was complicated, as we reported in the previous material, by the war in Yugoslavia.

According to FELIX specialists, at the initial stage of independent Chechnya's development, large-scale drug business was not in the sphere of interests of Dudayev's regime. The initial capital came from illegal arms sales, financial swindles—mainly involving fake letters of credit—and plundering oil and transportation communications. In addition, thanks to the "inherited" pool of aircraft and the lack of any control on the part of the Russian authorities in this area, the Chechen leaders successfully established a transit contraband channel. According to experts' information, in 1992-1993 Russian traffic control services registered every month on average 100-150 unauthorized flights by large aircraft from Chechnya (from Khankala, Groznyy-North, and Kalinovka airports) to cities of the former USSR and to other countries—Turkey, Iran, Jordan, the United Arab

Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and even Africa. Every month up to \$100 million worth of various goods entered Chechnya without paying custom duties or fees. Members of the Dudayev regime began taking up the drug business professionally only after contacts with former high-ranking officials of the USSR KGB, established in the end of 1991. Dudayev's confederates (this is particularly true of Usman Imayev), and Dudayev himself too, by virtue of the positions they had held in the USSR times, had quite warm and high-level relations with members of the special services. Now these connections were reactivated, but at a somewhat different level. According to FELIX's information, the principal agreement on the use of "free Chechnya's" unlimited transportation and contraband potential for drug transportation was achieved at talks between Dudayev's top officials with several former KGB officers. The group of people who undertook implementation of this project somewhat later formed the foundation of the "Moscow drug group"—a full-fledged international-scale group. According to available data, its organizers and leaders were several high-ranking officers of the former USSR KGB (for understandable reasons, their names are not made public). It is noteworthy that at the time this union was formed, some of them were still active service officers in the security services of Russia and the CIS. As business grew, the group's membership expanded considerably, but the leadership remained the same. Interestingly, in the course of common work and for reasons of its illegal nature, these people began calling each other by nicknames under certain circumstances (these are quoted here unchanged). One of them, because he spent a considerable amount of time in Uzbekistan, was called the Shah; others were nicknamed Ilich, Don Alex, and others. To avoid confusion, henceforth in the text these people will be identified by their nicknames.

Specialists note that the officers who joined this group had extensive experience in intelligence, combat, and analytical and covert work, as well as purely personal connections in many countries of both the near and far abroad. In addition, at the time they already had fairly good contacts with their former colleagues who had gone into business and banking, including dealing with foreign countries. As a result, the group's founders had ample opportunities to organize international channels for moving drugs, utilizing in this regard legal business mechanisms, access to the banking systems of other countries (especially Great Britain, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Gibraltar, Cyprus, the Bahamas, and the Antilles), as well as money "laundering" and income-hiding.

Reliable People, Reliable Equipment, Reliable Transportation

Specialists note that the Moscow group set its first channel through still "fresh" and reliable connections with field commanders of the armed forces in northern Afghanistan, established in the 1980's through the USSR KGB and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

KhAD (security service) (at the time of their work in the KGB the Shah, Ilich, and Don Alex spent several years each in Afghanistan as advisers and specialists). At the time, the Moscow group's main partner was General Rashid Dustum, the leader of Afghan Uzbek armed formations, who had quite close contacts with the special services during the war. According to FELIX's information, these contacts continued after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, since a number of former Soviet advisers and specialists remained in northern Afghanistan on a private basis. One of them, a KGB officer nicknamed Gypsy, began to represent Moscow drug businessmen's interests. According to available information, this man is in charge of local purchases of raw opium, forming consignments, and shipping them down the chain. It should be noted that the procurement of opium in Afghanistan by itself is a rather uncomplicated matter. For the majority of the population in this region, opium is probably more easily available than foodstuffs. For many local residents, its harvesting and sale are practically the only means of income. Suffice it to say that smugglers buy opium on the Afghan side of the border at \$40-50 per kg. According to available information, most of the "merchandise" procured by the Moscow group was stored not far from the border and guarded by Dustum's militia. Using simple home-made equipment, the opium was in the same facilities processed into morphine. As the quantity of the drug accumulated, consignments of 2-3 tonnes on average were shipped by truck or helicopter under the guise of commercial goods (or together with them) over the Uzbekistani border to airfields in Termez and Samarkand. According to FELIX's data, security on route and at transshipment points was provided by the Shah, who had extensive connections in Tashkent. Under his people's supervision, morphine was loaded at airfields onto aircraft of private airlines (controlled by the Chechen partners) and delivered by direct flight to Chechnya.

Once there, the cargo was unloaded practically legally and under the guard of Dudayev regime "official" agencies. According to FELIX's data, the question of setting up a special drug-handling base in Chechnya had been discussed back at the talks with the Moscow group's organizers in the fall of 1991. To the best of anybody's knowledge, this base was located in a small facility near Shali. Soon after the talks, in the middle of November, one of the former KGB officers, Ilich, and his Chechen partner Said purchased in England a small but modern pharmaceutical factory and brought it to the facility. The equipment had the capability of processing morphine into heroin, at the same time providing a level of purity of the "merchandise" at the time unachievable for other drug operators. It is noteworthy that the equipment was brought to the site, installed, and put on line in a matter of two to three weeks, and in December was already putting out the first "product."

From the very first days of its operations, by order of the Department of State Security's (DGB) chief, the Shali branch of the DGB provided special security for the

facility. According to FELIX's information, actual security protection of the drug base in Shali was carried out by a specially created detachment of about 100 Chechens and mercenaries (mainly consisting of former members of spetsnaz, OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments], and such). Interestingly, in addition to drugs, this base was used for storage and transshipment of arms, arms accessories, and ammunition coming from the Soviet military's local military depots, from Mongolia, the GDR, Lithuania, and other sources that have never been identified.

According to available information, the drug processing line operated nonstop until January 1995. According to experts' evaluation, during 1994 alone it produced about 30 tonnes of pure heroin. It is noteworthy that at the beginning of January the Russian Air Force conducted an air strike against the base. The next day, an attempt was made to airdrop to the base area by helicopter a mobile force made up of FELIX personnel and one of spetsnaz services. The group was unable to break through to the base, however, and had to be evacuated. After that, the base was subjected to massive air strikes several more times, and then another mobile force was airdropped there. This time they encountered no resistance, and the specialists easily reached the facility. Upon examination it turned out that part of the base had been completely destroyed by bombs, and whatever may have survived presumably had been evacuated.

Over the preceding three years, however, production in Shali operated quite successfully. According to FELIX's information, the final drug product was stored at the same base and then shipped, as needed, via different routes. In the first stage, a considerable part of the drug output was sold through Chechen connections in Libya. In the same way as from Uzbekistan, heroin was shipped by the same private airline aircraft from Grozny to Tripoli or Benghazi. From there, local smugglers through channels in Spain and Northern Ireland (mainly through local terrorist organizations) sold the drugs on the European market. However, at the end of 1992 the Chechen group, because of the Libyan side's excessive, in their opinion, appetites, began to phase out these shipments. At the same time they conducted a series of negotiations on the subject of new transit routes for drugs with people from the Georgian paramilitary organization Mkhedrioni, and a little later—with people connected with the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of Lithuania. According to available information, the main credit for this goes to current Chechen Vice President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. The new channels began to operate practically right away, sometime between the middle and end of 1992. It is noteworthy that since the end of 1993, through the efforts of Shamil Basayev (at the time leader of the Chechen volunteers in Abkhazia and currently commander of the "Abkhaz" battalion in Chechnya) another—Abkhaz—channel of drug smuggling was set up.

According to FELIX's information, the bulk of heroin was shipped through Georgian "friends." The same private aircraft carried a consignment of drugs to Kutaisi, and from there, under the supervision of members of Mkhedrioni, was transferred to helicopters and delivered to the port of Poti. Here they ensured that the "merchandise" passed through customs and was safely loaded on a Ukrainian-flag sea-going vessel. According to available information, this ship is for all intents and purposes controlled by Ilich. It runs between Black Sea ports and makes trans-Atlantic runs to the Caribbean. Actually, it was Ilich who organized the sea part of this route. According to available information, he generally has the reputation of being quite a specialist in this respect and controls another such "drug ship" working a different route (more on this later). According to some sources, about 15 tonnes of Chechnya-produced heroin were shipped via the Georgian channel in 1994. Another 5 tonnes were transported by this ship through Abkhaz ports (the "Abkhaz route").

The Moscow group unloaded almost three-quarters of this quantity of drugs in Romania. There the cargo was received and safeguarded by a certain "Dr. Dumitru"—in the past a Securitate officer and now a rather big businessman. Like the Moscow officers, he used old connections in Hungary, Italy, Austria, and Germany to deliver drugs to West Europe, where the cargo was purchased wholesale by Italian mafiosi. The remainder (which in 1994 amounted to 5-7 tonnes) was delivered by the same ship to Cuba. There, the cargo was received by one of the local generals associated with the Cuban MVD and known in drug business circles as Don Aberaldo. From there, through long-established and developed channels of shipping Colombian cocaine into the United States, the heroin was shipped to Florida. It is noteworthy that on the return trip from Cuba, Ilich's ship delivered to Poti large consignments of Colombian cocaine. According to FELIX experts' estimates, about 25-30 tonnes of it arrived in Georgia in 1994. Then through the efforts of some Mkhedrioni members the cocaine was delivered to the Razdan area (Armenia) and stored in a commercial facility controlled by Yerevan businessmen known as Tigran and Levon. From there, as needed, the cocaine returned in smaller consignments to Poti and on the same ship was sent to "Dr. Dumitru," and from there, following the aforementioned scheme, to Europe.

The Baltic Direction: Drug Window to Europe?

At the end of 1992 the Chechen group established a channel for delivering drugs to Europe and the United States through the Baltics. Heroin was carried by the aforementioned aircraft from Chechen airports to Lithuania, to several airfields in the Vilnius and Liepaja area. In 1994 about 8 tonnes of drugs were shipped through this channel. Half of that quantity was shipped through the channels of a certain Romasis, who was associated with the Lithuanian MVD, through the port of Klaipeda on ferries to the German Rugen island, and

from there, with the flow of contraband nonferrous metals and other raw materials—to Germany. There the heroin was received by people of the aforementioned Chechen Said and sold in large wholesale consignment to Sicilians. Another approximately 1.5 to 2 tonnes came to Austria and Germany through “diplomatic channels.” This method of shipment was organized by a person named Povilas, who was associated with the Lithuanian MFA. At the other end of the channel the heroin was received by the same Said. Now would probably be a good time to explain such great abilities on the part of this person. According to FELIX’s information, Said is a relative of Sultan Geliskhanov; however, he earned his authority solely in the criminal business through his own efforts. Said started as long ago as the early-1980’s as a rank-and-file racketeer. In time, he successfully set up semi-legal business and redirected his efforts mainly to the drug trade, at first on a strictly domestic level, and later expanded into the international arena. It is noteworthy that on his travels around the world, Said established business contacts with criminal groups in a variety of regions—Nakhodka, Vladivostok, Moscow, the Baltics, and Germany (including in the former Western Group of Forces).

Let us go back, however, to the Chechen-Baltic heroin. Another more or less half a tonne of heroin brought from Shali was delivered by ship from Klaipeda to England. The remaining part—between 1.5 and 2 tonnes—was sold by the Chechens in Vilnius to an Estonian group headed by a man nicknamed Forester, who is currently a legislator. Forester shipped the drugs on from Tallinn through the channels of two allied groups headed by two retired U.S. Army officers—ethnic Estonians. They are well known in the criminal world, not only in the Baltics but also in CIS countries, under their Russified nicknames Yura and Sasha. Using their good connections in the Estonian transportation system, they shipped their heroin by sea-going ferry to Stockholm. From there the drug was sent “in the pouch” to Washington through the channels of a former CIA officer B. (currently a big businessman).

It is noteworthy that when it comes to contraband—not only of drugs but also of Russian [words missing] and Estonia are not allies but in fact very bitter rivals. This is due to the fact that Lithuanians, at least in the drug business, gravitate to the Moscow and Chechen groups. While the aforementioned Forester, for instance, as already mentioned, works with U.S.-oriented people, who have their own channels of procurement, processing, and transportation of drugs both from Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iran. (By the way, the Pakistani police recently confiscated in the Peshavar suburbs more than 7 tonnes of heroin that belonged to these people, all ready to be shipped to the United States both through Karachi and through the territory of the former USSR.) Thus, according to FELIX’s information, the purchase of “Chechen” heroin in Lithuania was a purely commercial

deal that had no relation to the Moscow group’s business. The 1.5-2 tonnes purchased there for G.B., Forester, and his partners were only an accidental and relatively small lot of drugs compared to the total turnover. Estonian smugglers (and among them, according to FELIX’s information, are people from the armed formation Kaitseliit notorious for their involvement in the arms trade) get the bulk of their merchandise from Iranian and local smugglers in Osh Oblast in southern Kyrgyzstan. Thanks to connections with a local informal leader, who controls this region and is protected by corrupt bureaucrats, Estonian drug dealers, like their Chechen colleagues, loaded the “merchandise” aboard their private aircraft and flew it to Estonia through either Baku or Riga. According to available information, last fall, however, Forester and his colleagues ran into a streak of bad luck. According to one version, it stemmed from the Estonia ferry tragedy and the investigation that was launched into the causes of its wreck.

According to FELIX’s information, the most complete information on the Estonian drug-shipping channel and local smugglers was collected by Igor Krishtapovich, formerly head of the anti-contraband directorate of the Estonian SSR KGB and in post-Soviet times deputy general director of the republic’s customs department. According to FELIX’s information, through the opportunities presented by his position and his old connections, he collected a sizable cache of documents and covert audio taps of telephone conversations regarding the activities of Estonian mafiosi. According to available information, one of Forester’s partners, Yura, learning of Krishtapovich’s investigation, ordered his “removal.” In November, Krishtapovich was killed in Tallinn with two shots to the head. However, by that time he had already passed some of the material he had collected to both the Russian and the American special services.

The Echelons Have Departed for the East

The latest events in Chechnya naturally made the Moscow group and their Chechen partners face the necessity of dealing again with the question of the production base. According to FELIX’s information, this was done in a businesslike, fast, and simple manner. As soon as it became clear that Dudayev’s regime would not withstand the Russian troops’ offensive and the drug facility in Shali was living its last few days, an “operational” meeting was held in Moscow. According to available information, it was held some time around 10 January, at the same time as the Russian flag was flown over Dudayev’s palace, in a room in the Rossiya hotel in Moscow. Present at the meeting were three representatives from the Chechen side: Usman Imayev, Taymaz Abubakarov, and Said, as well as Don Alex, Ilich, a Lithuanian partner representative, and one of the Moscow group’s treasurers, Kostik (a London businessman and Israeli citizen). It is noteworthy that in principle the question of moving the production base had been decided somewhat earlier. At this meeting the gathering discussed details of drug transportation, distribution of “quotas” between groups, volumes of delivery

in each direction, and division of profits. According to FELIX's information, it was decided to move the processing of morphine into heroin closer to the source of the raw materials—to the territory of northern Afghanistan. Interestingly, among the initial proposals for the "production" site were Tyumen Oblast and Samarkand Oblast in Uzbekistan, but they were rejected. It is noteworthy that the needed equipment was purchased in the shortest time, delivered through Uzbekistan to a site in the Akchi area, and is already operating to full capacity. As to the routes of heroin transportation, they have changed only insignificantly. As before, the "merchandise" goes by air from Termez and Samarkand, and to these cities they are delivered by helicopter from the territory of Afghanistan—from the Akchi and Mazari-Sharif areas.

'Heroin by the Boatload...'

Actually, it would be naive to presume that in doing business the Moscow group would have limited itself to just one channel and one region of drug "harvesting." According to FELIX's information, at the end of 1992-beginning of 1993 they established a channel for delivering morphine and heroin from the "golden triangle" region (the mountainous areas of Burma, Thailand, and Laos, which supplies 45 percent of the world's illegal opium). Although it would be more precise to say that they took control of an already mainly established channel.

This channel began to function independently back in 1989 at the initiative of several former USSR KGB officers who worked as advisers in Laos and Vietnam. By virtue of special nature of their work, these officers, among other things, had contacts with members of so-called Shan rebels, who were fighting an armed rebellion against the official authorities for the independence of the Shan province (Burma) and at the same time were the largest world suppliers of opium and heroin. The rebels control a large area of mountain jungle and as a by-product cultivate large natural poppy plantations. Their head is the local leader Khun Sa [name as transliterated], who is officially on the international wanted list. Against the background of confusion that has descended over Soviet enforcement agencies, these officers at first began to supply the rebels with arms from Laos army warehouses. The key role in this business was played by a former USSR KGB officer, later nicknamed Kolyan by the Moscow group. Soon the rebels, who were experiencing financial difficulties, proposed to pay with morphine instead of money. As a result, a rather large system emerged, which included members of criminal groups of Vietnam, the Far East, corrupt officers of the Russian (at the time still Soviet) Navy, and bureaucrats in the MFER [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations] structure.

According to FELIX's information, the rebels delivered morphine through Mekong to Laos. From Laos, the morphine consignments were shipped by air to Vietnam,

to the city-port of Cam Ranh, which to this day houses the materiel base of the Russian Navy. Here the shipment was received by people who were part of the base personnel, who shipped it by ground route to Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City). In a Saigon suburb—Shalon—one of the local groups set up a small laboratory for processing morphine into heroin. At first Kolyan, through his connections in the Navy, shipped the heroin to Maritime Kray, and from there through Moscow to Germany, where he sold it through the Western Group of Forces to Italians (with Said as the middleman). At a certain stage several bureaucrats associated with the MFER merged into this business. After that, some of the heroin was packed into containers with rare-wood lumber and exported to Russia. According to available information, most of the factories for which this Vietnamese product was destined were in the central region. It is here that the heroin was removed from the containers and through the connections of Moscow bureaucrats and the military was shipped to Germany, Austria, and on. It is noteworthy that by international standards this channel was rather small. And in December 1992 it dried up altogether. First, in Saigon the local police uncovered the lab in Shalon. Second, at the same time the Moscow bureaucrats' positions in their agencies became very shaky.

The Moscow group, which knew of the existence of this channel, took advantage of the situation. In the winter of 1992-1993 the Moscow officers conducted negotiations with the bureaucrats, who had found themselves out of business, and came to an agreement—the latter would deliver their connection with Kolyan in exchange for partnership in the Moscow group. The channel began to operate again, but this time the routes changed somewhat. The Shan partners still retained the function of procuring opium from mountain peasants and shipping it to Laos. From there it went by air transit with the participation of various parties through the airports of Hue Sai, Savannakhet, Louangphrabang, and ended up in Khmer territory. Members of the Khmer Rouge, through their old contacts in the DPRK, got the morphine to Korean smugglers. The latter (who were already direct partners of the Moscow group) delivered the heroin to the North Korean port of Wonsan and under the guise of commercial cargo loaded it onto a Russian marine vessel controlled by the aforementioned Illich. The ship, which made commercial runs from the Russian Far East and the Yemen ports of Adan and Hodeida (with stopovers in Indian ports) delivered the drug to Yemen. FELIX specialists note, the main credit for organizing this route goes to the Shah, who worked for many years in Korea and Yemen. From Yemen the heroin, together with the flow of contraband of South Korean-made consumer goods, was sent by Chechen aircraft to the Shali facility in Chechnya.

However, in mid-1994 this channel too began to unravel. Because of the civil war in Yemen the Chechens lost their connections with the South Yemen partners, and at the end of 1994 the president of Yemen completely eliminated the transit channel. In addition, the Moscow

group's financial relations with North Korean smugglers became tense because the latter began to demand payment for service in the form of too specific defense items. As a result, the Moscow group's leaders once again changed the shipping route of the Shan drugs. This was facilitated by the fact that in 1994 Khun Sa implemented "modernization" of his drug business and proposed to pay for the contraband arms he received through Laos with ready heroin (and of rather good quality at that). The drugs again began to come by air to Cam Ranh, and from there, on Pacific Fleet ships—to the Russian Far East. Here the heroin was delivered to the aforementioned Said, who loaded it onto the aforementioned Ilich's ship. The vessel currently specializes in trans-Atlantic runs to Latin America (officially for bananas and coffee). On route, in neutral water near the Mexican coast, the heroin is offloaded onto private Mexican ships, and then through the Tijuana drug cartel's channels is delivered to the United States. Approximately over the past half-year Ilich's ship delivered more than 3 tonnes of heroin to American drug addicts this way.

'Dirty' Money in 'Clean' Hands

Against the background of all these large-scale operations being conducted by the Moscow and Chechen groups, we should not forget that they were organized not by regular criminals but, understandably, by quite intellectual people. Formally most of them do not have criminal records and are respected businessmen and politicians. The core of this criminal community spends most of its time not in Moscow or Chechnya but far outside the former USSR—in London, New York, Frankfurt, and numerous off-shore zones. In particular, the center of financial activities for laundering dirty money is in London. It is from here that the drug dollars are cycled through various trust companies and flow, among other places, into Russia too. According to available information, this money goes to buying up shares of large enterprises of export-producing sectors in the economy. Then the shares are sold (sometimes even for less than the purchase price) and return to the West already "clean." It is noteworthy that this system of money laundering is deeply integrated in analogous systems of Colombian, Sicilian, Mexican, and other drug traffickers.

Remarkably, in the current Russian conditions members of the Moscow and Chechen groups cannot manage without bringing in openly criminal structures. According to FELIX's information, the Moscow group utilizes two purely criminal structures (in the current commonly used sense of the word in Russia), headed by people nicknamed Cross and Savvykh. To the best of our knowledge, these people have authority in criminal circles, have several convictions on their records, and have their own muscle groups. These formations' activities are not directly related to drugs. Their function is enforcement (without which a profitable business can hardly operate these days) in the conduct of financial operations involving money laundering. However, as

FELIX's specialists note, the sphere of activities of Cross and Savvykh covers only the territory of Russia, mainly its central part. More remote regions are the province of Said's people. P.S. Naturally, it is impossible to cover in this material all the drug syndicates that exist and operate on the territory of the former USSR. For instance, equally active is the group of the aforementioned businessman and former CIA officer B. In FELIX experts' estimates, last year alone about 12 tonnes of heroin was shipped through this group's most popular routes (Pakistan—Tajikistan—Georgia—Turkey—Yugoslavia—Italy and France—the United States). We will be publishing material on this and other groups soon; it should be kept in mind, however, that this article describes only the general scheme and the most important directions of the drug syndicate's activities. To the extent possible, we will also present more details of its work.

Media Issues

*Acting Chief of Information Directorate Nosovets Interviewed

954F1762A Moscow OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 10, 9-15 Mar 95 p 12

[Interview with Sergey Nosovets, acting chief of the Information Directorate of the presidential administration, worked on by Ann Politkovskaya, in Moscow, 6 March: "These Words Have Lost Their Freshness"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Further, we talked at length with Sergey Nosovets about his directorate, about state information policy in which he is engaged, and about possible decisions of the president in regard to the mass media. It was an ordinary interview with the Kremlin chief which began nervously and then calmed down. Everything would have come out then, the interview would have appeared, had it not been for its date—it was 1 March, already towards evening. In five-six hours the country would shudder from yet another journalist's death—Vladislav Listyev.

On 6 March, when the interview fit the issue, the editors received a telephone call from Sergey Nosovets. He proposed that the previous interview be considered as not having taken place, and demanded another interview with the same questions since the replies of 1 March, in his opinion, had lost their freshness. As a result, the correspondent of OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA for the second time connected the dictaphone....

[Boxed item]

DOSSIER. Sergey Anatolyevich Nosovets is 37 years old; he was born in the city of Mezhdurechensk, Kemerovo Oblast. He worked in a plant, served in the Army, graduated from the faculty of journalism of MGU [Moscow State University], and then worked in the Omsk Television and Radio Committee. He was a deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet (a member for the Committee on Mass

Media). He is now acting chief of the Information Directorate of the presidential administration. He is married and has two daughters.

"We have an excess of journalistic solidarity," Sergey Nosovets, acting chief of the Information Directorate of the presidential administration, believes.

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] Why do you so frequently talk in public about the fact that journalists should not so strongly overemphasize the death of their colleagues.

[Nosovets] Really, this alarms me most of all now. Although I, myself, am a journalist, I was not in the hot spots. All my hot spots were limited by the party obkom [oblast committee], where they discharged and removed me. But then the Chechen events occur. The death count went into the thousands. And against this background a journalist dies. Here his death is singled out over all the others: photographs, trips to the editors, rewards. All the mass media—only about this. They present stories about his merits, his biography, devoting entire pages and hours of air time to this. In so doing we, the journalists, do not know and have not tried to find out a single fact at all about the other hundreds and thousands who have died.

Thus, the journalist, through the efforts of the journalists themselves, is singled out as a separate figure, which, as a minimum, demands separate attention and effort. The impression is formed that colleagues are simply waiting for the next death, the count is open. They are waiting because this shocks more than the rest. The subject of the murdered journalist is being persistently twisted in public opinion. I am convinced we need to be less pretentious.

One more detail: I am looking at the Fund for the Defense of Glasnost, and questions arise in my mind about why the journalists working in Russia are less concerned about their own fate and working conditions than their collaborators and other such near-journalistic [okolozhurnalistskiye] structures.

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] Does it not seem to you that this is quite natural in conditions where the authorities are not too concerned about the security of their citizens, where it has become fashionable to accuse journalists of the most terrible sins, not taking too much trouble with evidence, where there is criminal license all around?

[Nosovets] No. I do not trust the trade unions and other semiprofessional organizations because, for example, the miners' trade unions long ago have forgotten when they were in the pit-face. All these unions of journalists—not you, not I, no one knows what they are engaged in. I hope, you feel that there is already an excess of journalistic solidarity.

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] I do not feel . . .

[Nosovets] It is a pity. Solidarity should lie not in the fact that someone died and they shout about this. All must

pitch in money together, but not yell in every corner. Think for yourself, how the soldiers at the front in Chechnya must feel when they constantly read in the newspapers about the journalists who were killed, and, then, loosing a large number of their friends in an attack and reading almost nothing about this. Moreover, the mass media love to go from the death of a specific journalist to the authorities—they say the authorities are to blame, and this is where it began.

There Are Different Journalists, It Turns Out, as Are Their Deaths

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] In that case, I would like to clarify the main thing—your position on whether our journalists themselves do not overemphasize the death of their colleagues.

[Nosovets] The death of Vlad [Listyev] and the death of journalists in the Chechen war are different things. Vlad is not only a journalist, but also a leader of such important strategic orientation that it is difficult to compare him with anyone else in the country. You will agree, how can one compare—in terms of the extent of the tasks confronting us—Vlad with the foreign journalism that has come under fire in Chechnya? You see, here, outwardly at least, we do not have a war; a man dies at the entrance to his own home, coming from work! . . . And these things I cannot compare.

When, on 27 February in the television press club, we discussed the situation of the work of journalists in the conflict zone in Chechnya, I expressed my anxiety and concern over the inadequacy of the elucidation, by journalists, of the facts surrounding the death of their colleagues in the war, if one compares their attitude to the thousands of human tragedies in Chechnya. In my view, the war puts all its participants, all those who carry out their professional duty there, in different conditions, and in the conditions of general tragedy one cannot single out anyone on the basis of the principle of parochial solidarity. Here I do not admit any parallels with the death of Listyev. His death will have to be proclaimed, and proclaimed throughout the world—society has been issued a challenge in the most cynical form. The president was simply shocked.

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] Don't you believe that Listyev's death is the result, in particular, of the recent activity of the president, his tolerance of the bloodshed in the country, of which Chechnya has become the most terrible example, and, moreover, the latest tragedy took place simply with his blessing?

[Nosovets] No. I categorically reject this association. The actions of the president in Chechnya were aimed at preventing the criminal metastasis from spreading throughout the country. All possible means for negotiations were utilized, but the category of persons defending the criminal sovereignty of Chechnya does not present itself in any other environment except the criminal one. It was for this reason that force had to be used. In the

case with Vlad, Chechnya has nothing to do with it. Here we are dealing with the redivision of ownership and economic relations in "Ostankino". There exists an information field and enormous capital that revolves around it.

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] In your view, what in general is the journalist's death in our society now?

[Nosovets] The death of the journalist is the same kind of tragedy as the death of any man. Moreover, the journalist stood here in the same rank with politicians and businessmen. When a journalist is killed in order to paralyze the will of whoever follows, there is action of inducing fright, which has become a trend. When they kill a journalist who is able to make public terrible facts, to reveal a trend that threatens society, they kill for the purpose of breaking the resistance of others to criminal invasion. This is an extremely serious stage of anarchy. So that in this case for me the death of a journalist is the death of Vlad. I want to emphasize once again that all of these words do not pertain to the death of a journalist in the Chechen conflict zone.

I liked Vlad very much. I was not personally acquainted with him, but he was 2 years ahead of me at the university, and we played basketball together. In many things he tried to be first, and for this he was interesting to observe. When on 19 August we organized the work of a radio station in the White House, Vlad came there at once—he had no other choice then. And we, of course, drew up big plans for cooperation with him in ORT [Ostankino Radio and Television].

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] Does it seem to you that there will be other victims among journalists?

[Nosovets] The prerequisites in society exist. But I would not want to court disaster.

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] Remember, it is boring for me to raise all the same questions. Allow me to change the course of the interview somewhat. It is interesting, but how do you here, in this well-appointed office on Staraya Ploshchad in Moscow, feel the anarchy that is reigning in the country?

[Nosovets] I am completely impotent. I am full of despair. Already because I was convinced—with Vlad we had obtained a very good variant for cooperation in the plan for the formation of a new state information policy. ORT is its most striking example. In the future ORT was bound to cooperate actively with the state structures, including with ours, on the level of obtaining information about the activity of the organs of power, which are important components of information policy.

It is regrettable that one of the most important steps of the president towards the creation of a genuinely free information market in Russia encountered at once such an outrageous tragedy. When Vlad Listyev was elected as director general, it was clear to everyone that this would not be an ordinary appointment to "Ostankino." Will

serious steps follow? It goes without saying, the decision about his election was the decision of the founders of ORT. However, I know for an absolute fact that the candidacy of Listyev enjoyed full support on the part of the presidential administration. Who will come after him? To what extent will it prove possible to find a suitable person?

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] Do you know who in the presidential administration was involved in the selection of these people who have become shareholders of ORT?

[Nosovets] No. The Information Directorate was not involved in this. Moreover, I never saw the founding documents of ORT; although, I am personally a member of its Board of Trustees, the head of which, I recall, is the president himself. I know that the documents regarding ORT were endorsed by Sergey Filatov. I think, he took part in the subsequent actions with respect to ORT as well. The presidential administration, in principle, does not intend to become part of the Council of Directors. And participation in the Board of Trustees, as I myself conceive of it, is some meeting once or twice a year. I tried not to interfere in anything in ORT.

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] How correct is the assertion of S. Shakhray that not long ago a division of responsibilities took place between the presidential administration and the government in the sphere of the mass media? The administration is engaged in the ideological aspect of the matter, and the government—in economic questions.

[Nosovets] Yes, there is such a thing. Ideology was left to us, and I am not ashamed of these words. We are engaged in propaganda and agitation, which are all the same based on information.

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] In the near future can we expect from your directorate any legislative initiatives of an ideological character in the sphere of the mass media?

[Nosovets] For the time being, I have no idea how this can be done because to rule through an ideology is impossible now. One could only dream in part, for example, with fascism, but I, myself, have no idea what a presidential edict about the prohibition of fascism in Russia can be like.

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] You create the impression of a man who is entirely devoted to President Yeltsin. What is he for you—an unquestionable authority, a boss whose actions are not discussed, a man from your hometown who is like you?

[Nosovets] All of this—in parts. After the death of my father, I very much wanted to regard someone as my spiritual father. Now I have two of them: Viktor Astafyev, the great writer, and Boris Yeltsin. I have always been at his side, regardless of everything that has happened, regardless of the various assessments of his conduct. For the time being, I do not see any reason to doubt his sincerity and the correctness of his decisions.

Moreover, we are also brought together by the fact that in the Army Boris Nikolayevich was a tank commander, and I—a gun layer.

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] Are you ready to forgive him even his alienation from the democrats, who were also your comrades-in-arms?

[Nosovets] Who are those democrats?! Yushenkov? Yakunin? Lev Ponomarev? Galina Vasilyevna Starovoitova? And Sergey Adamovich Kovalev.... I do not see a creative force in his recent activity. Basically, this is ever more destruction. The struggle with the authorities has become an inner end in itself for Kovalev. He has a salesman complex. He is a sort of eternal dissident, extremely left wing. I can say the same about the respected Mikhail Molostvov. One cannot sit in the bunker with bandits.

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] Does it not seem to you that the tragic consequences of the attraction of the head of state to alcohol may be significantly greater for Russia than the conduct of Kovalev and Molostvov?

[Nosovets] For the time being no, fortunately. I am convinced that the inadequate variants in the conduct of Boris Nikolayevich are an important threat to his personal rating, but not to the country. Of course, we experience this very deeply here. But the important meaning of his staying in power lies in continuing the course. Even in spite of Chechnya, today the situation in Russia is unique in terms of its stability. If, of course, we abstract ourselves from Moscow, from the squabbles of the small party groups.

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] Many now talk about the fact that in that terrible night after the killing of Vladislav Listyev they changed their views. Does this pertain to you?

[Nosovets] My views have become more sober, more pointed. During the night of the killing I received a knockdown. I hope, not a knockout. The first sensation, when I found out about everything, was the appearance of some kind of claustrophobia, of terrifying locked-up night space, and you wish for morning to come more quickly, so as to be able to gather one's thoughts. On the other hand, strictly speaking, nothing has changed—you know, we knew very well before that there are bandits about and that they kill people. The sort of feeling that the bandits intend to keep us permanently in such a state. But at some point this must come to an end!

[OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA] Do you, being too close to power, feel responsibility for the tragedy with Listyev?

[Nosovets] Absolutely no, I will not say what you expect me to say. I will not retire! I am convinced that I need to work. What has happened only intensifies this desire for me.

P.S. As was, what was, was. In a short time, the views of our hero underwent a certain transformation about which we

hasten to inform our respected readers. Collating the two texts, which are separated by only four days and nights in the capital, gives food for reflections about the nerves of people who constitute the closest entourage of the president.

Military & Space Issues

*Military Printer Produces 'Racist' Works

954F2058A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Apr 95
p 1

[Article by Aleksey Chelnokov, personal correspondent: "The Building With a Mezzanine, a Military Printing Office, and Racist Literature"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The professor from the University of Budapest was stunned: "Now we have seen everything: It turns out that racist literature can be sold without any difficulty in the center of Moscow." What surprised him even more, however, was that all of this pseudo-intellectual garbage was being printed on a Defense Ministry press.

He held up a leaflet distributed by the "Association of Russian Rightwing Publishers":

"The defense of the white man's rights.... The deliverance of rightwing periodicals from the jurisdiction of financial mechanisms.... The creation of a sales network in military academies, higher academic institutions, the Management Academy, the State Duma, railroad stations, rare book stores, and libraries"—these are the goals of the association, which was formed around two months ago.

Its main goal, however, is to increase the circulation of its publications a hundredfold! There is also another goal: "In the event of success (even partial), the establishment of a mobile administrative agency—the Conservative Revolution Bureau." Such wide-ranging ambitions!

The leaflet lists the titles for sale and includes a rough map. The store is located half a km from the Kremlin, in "the building with the mezzanine"—that is how it is labeled on the map.

Following the route traced on the map, the IZVESTIYA correspondent reached the door of Room 5. A cryptic inscription on a tattered leatherette placard said: "Expedition-2, MD CPO 12." Beyond the doorway there were rows of bookshelves, separated by stands holding display copies. I read the titles: "The Putrid Stains of the Spread of Jewish Influence," "German National Socialism," "Aryan Rus," "Portraits on a Swastika Background."

Swastikas without portraits were plentiful on the pages of the newspapers lying in bundles nearby. One of the leaders of the association, Pavel Tulayev, told me this:

"We are still trying to make ends meet: The profit from the publications barely covers our expenses, but we were

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not even hoping for commercial success. The main thing was to convey our beliefs to the people."

Almost all of the racist and rightwing extremist literature published in Moscow and outlying regions ends up here, in "the building with the mezzanine." From here it is sent in small shipments to numerous "points of sale"—in editions from 1,000 to 10,000 copies. Is there much demand for this literature—if it can be described as such?

"On the average, we sell 5,000 copies every six months," Tulayev said. "We sold around 100 copies of 'Aryan Rus' when the congress of Ruskoy's party was in session."

The prices are incredible. A set of 50 copies of a brochure entitled "The Jews," for example, costs only 1,200 rubles (the same price as the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion"), and 40 copies of "German National Socialism" are priced at 1,500 rubles. Why are they so cheap?

"We work without middlemen," Tulayev explained, "and print the literature ourselves."

A plain hard-cover book seemed to be out of place on the display stand among the other publications. I leafed through it. The title was "An Essay on the 60th Anniversary of the 12th Central Printing Office of the Ministry of Defense." I read further: "During the Great Patriotic War the orders of the supreme commander-in-chief on the advance of our forces were printed in this office.... Twenty-two members of our staff did not return from the front."

That is when I figured out the meaning of the inscription on the door of this contemporary distributor of fascist literature. It was an abbreviation for the Ministry of Defense Central Printing Office, which had given shelter and printing presses to people who had learned nothing from the war against Fascism.

P.S. Unfortunately, the IZVESTIYA correspondent was unable to contact the press director and his assistant, but it turned out that the 12th Printing Office of the Ministry of Defense is under the direct jurisdiction of the General Staff. It has been printing the confidential documents of the military establishment and its leaders since 1919. It is equipped with modern printing presses. We can only wonder why the General Staff is printing racist literature....

Regional Affairs

*Likhachev on Russia-Tatarstan Relations

954F2090A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in Russian 13 Apr 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with V. Likhachev, chairman of the Republic of Tatarstan State Council, by Aleksandr Frolov; place and date not given: "Moving Forward Together"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is no need for Vasily Likhachev to be introduced to the inhabitants of our republic. He became widely known after having assumed the office of vice president of the Republic of Tatarstan. It is sufficient to recall that the young vice president was repeatedly the winner in heated intellectual arguments on matters of principle with experienced Moscow politicians and diplomats. It was thanks to this to a considerable extent that the well-known treaty between Russia and Tatarstan, which removed the tension between the center and our republic, which was once head of the "sovereignty parade" of former autonomies, became a reality.

Vasily Likhachev is now chairman of the Republic of Tatarstan State Council. How are his fortunes in his new profession shaping up? What may the electorate expect from the new parliament and the recently elected speaker? What is his view of the relationship between Russia and Tatarstan?

This is the subject of journalist Aleksandr Frolov's interview with the chairman of the Republic of Tatarstan State Council.

[Frolov] Vasily Nikolayevich, there has come to be talk once again recently to the effect that it is necessary to "equalize" the components of the Federation and to "provincize" Russia since, certain politicians believe, the republics have taken too many rights for themselves, having thereby short-changed the krais and oblasts.... It would be interesting to know in this connection the opinion of the chairman of the State Council of Tatarstan—a republic that has a wealth of experience of interaction with the center.

[Likhachev] It is this experience accumulated by the republic in the reform of relations with the center and the experience of the conflict-free coexistence on the territory of the republic of 110 nationalities which ((word illegible)) our aspiration with reliance on our own powers and our own resources to change the socioeconomic format of the republic and permit a highly critical evaluation of the idea of the "provincization" of Russia. This idea is being put into political circulation, in my view, in order to attune public opinion to abrupt movements. Why is it today precisely that there has come to be talk about the need for Russia's federal arrangement based on provinces?

It would seem to me that the proposition concerning "provincization" has been launched with a definite ideological purpose—to distract attention from unresolved economic problems and to shape the opinion that the most important problem today is that of the national-state arrangement. Of course, it is not fortuitous that this is being done prior to the elections to the State Duma and prior to the elections of the president of Russia. The idea of "provincization" is needed by the political forces that are endeavoring from the counterpoise of territorial and administrative-territorial formations and the republics to derive political capital for themselves.

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Yes, the rights of the regions need to be equalized. But let us first see how the regions realize the legal status that they already have. Nizhegorod Oblast and the Republic of Tatarstan, for example, could be compared in the sense that they are both actively implementing international programs. This in itself testifies that the problem is not one of legal status but of assertiveness and a capacity for realizing the existing authority locally. In accordance with the Federal Treaty, this authority is quite extensive both for the krais and oblasts and for the republics.

[Frolov] It is hard to imagine that those who are talking in earnest about the need for "provincization" do not know this. But is this idea being additionally charged by something or other?

[Likhachev] In addition, I believe, by the fact that fundamental problems of the new regional policy and a normal structure of interethnic relations have yet to be resolved. There is no regional policy, there is no policy of relations of the center and the regions either. And the supporters of "provincization" are attempting with the aid of this idea to avoid the problems ((line illegible)) Russia. But how can these problems be avoided thanks to a change of signboard?

It is essential for Russia to concern itself one way or another with a revival of the national languages and national culture in such a way that each individual may say with pride: "I am a Russian," "I am a Tatar," "I am a Jew." The resolution of these problems undoubtedly lies in the economic plane because only a developed economy, I do not contradict myself here, can ensure realization of human rights, including the rights to one's own language and one's own culture. And to unconditional respect for this right on the part of the representatives of other nationalities.

What has been said is important not only for Tatarstan, incidentally. Practically the same nationality grid is typical also of Nizhegorod Oblast, where Russians, Tatars, and representatives of other nationalities live, and of Samara Oblast, and the Republic of Mari El. There are altogether no mononational formations on the territory of Russia at the present time. We have to move forward together, consequently, not impeding but helping one another.

[Frolov] We heard about you at the first plenary session of the Republic of Tatarstan State Council as follows: Likhachev in the office of speaker means the start of an operation to implement the "Crimean option" on the part of Russia....

[Likhachev] I declare officially that such accusations are absolutely without foundation.

Whoever might want to belittle the significance of the Russian-Tatar treaty, this document and the 14 intergovernmental agreements are, for all that, compelling a search for new approaches to the "center-regions"

problem. I do not wish to say that Tatarstan has accomplished a revolution. It is simply that objective trends and objective regularities were discovered. As a result, relations between the Federation and our republic have acquired a new qualitative level.

[Frolov] But contradictions in the Constitutions of the Russian Federation and Tatarstan persist.

[Likhachev] This is a very important problem. It can be resolved by active realization of the Russian-Tatar accords. Particularly where they deal with the formation and development of the statehood of Tatarstan and also the joint authority of our republic and the organs of administration of Russia. The treaty contains enormous prospects. It is important that any government official, be he in Moscow or Kazan, treat with increased attention and responsibly the rights and obligations that are enshrined in the treaty.

[Frolov] How does the chairman of the republic State Council conceive of the participation of the supreme legislative body in the economic reform?

[Likhachev] There are two paths here. First, influence on economic transformations by use of our budget rights. The budget message is in preparation at this time. This question will be discussed at the next session. While considering social priorities and the need for subsidies for science and culture, we must remember nonetheless that the republic cannot dispose of funds as was the case five years ago, say. Economics now demand to be treated with respect.

Aside from the budget, commissions will be formed, as is customary in parliamentary practice, which will be able, I hope, to find a common language with specialists in the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan and devise by joint efforts the further strategy and tactics of the economic transformations.

[Frolov] Since we have begun to speak about the budget, how would you comment on such an item of expenditure as the upkeep of the corps of deputies? A report that it is contemplated spending up to 40 million rubles a month per member of parliament filtered into the press. Is this not somewhat on the high side?

[Likhachev] I would recall that at the first session President M.Sh. Zhaymiyev called on the deputies for self-denial. I, for my part, can report that one of my first decisions was to remove the personal automobiles from a number of deputies. This decision caused dissatisfaction, of course, but this cannot be helped....

As far as the expenditure and the amounts you have mentioned are concerned, it is something else that worries me more: Will we get our money's worth for the funds invested in the individual deputy and parliament as a whole? I would like to believe so. And, of course, the deputies should have all that they need for productive work.

[Frolov] Following these elections, the opposition has remained outside of parliament, virtually. But it exists, nonetheless, and will, of course, be following the activity of the State Council even more closely. Does this not worry you?

[Likhachev] Not in the least. Our republic's constitution, incidentally, guarantees the rights of the opposition, whose representatives, albeit few, have still been elected to parliament. Article 37 of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan says: "The rights, liberties, and dignity of the persons constituting the opposition minority in the representative authorities are guaranteed by law."

We are ready for dialogue with those who on this occasion "remain outside" also. Provided that their criticism and proposals are of a constructive nature. More broadly, we are open to any cooperation, just as long as its results are to the good of the republic. We are prepared both to share experience and to borrow experience of parliamentary practice. We have today sent our proposals for cooperation to members of parliament of Canada, Hungary, and Poland. I am sure that they will respond.

***Urals-Volga Regional Cooperation Viewed**

954F2091A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in
Russian 12 Apr 95 p 2

[Interview with Mars Shamsutdinov, deputy chairman of the Assembly of the Peoples of the Volga-Urals Region, by unidentified VOLGA-URAL information agency correspondent; place and date not given: "The Urals-Volga Region: Unbreakable Union of Free Republics?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The center no longer deals with the problems of the former autonomies, which today forms one of the main sources of tension on the territory of the former union. One would think that life itself has shown us that it is impossible to decide everything "from the top" in such a big country, but Moscow still has not worked out a unified state concept of regional policy. The events in Chechnya are tragic proof of it. Therefore, on 26-27 February 1994 in Cheboksary an international intergovernment organization was created at the founding congress of the peoples of the Urals and Volga region—the Assembly of the Peoples of the Volga-Urals Region (ANPU); Petr Khuzangay, chairman of the Chuvash National Congress and member of the presidium of the Chuvash Supreme Council, was elected its chairman; today our correspondent interviews his deputy, Kazan resident Mars Shamsutdinov.

[Correspondent] Mars Mukhamatdinovich, what are the historical preconditions for unification of the people of the Volga and the Urals regions?

[Shamsutdinov] There is a lot that unites us: history, settlement patterns, ecology, and economic and cultural ties. History itself has brought us together in a tight knot,

and it is easier for us to solve our common problems together. Territorial proximity; the presence of convenient transportation routes, in particular, the Volga, Kama, and Belaya rivers; and common interests make the Volga and Urals regions a natural economic region, within the boundaries of which we need to create special structures stimulating the development of common market relations. Together, it will be easier for us to survive in the harsh conditions of the market. And in the future there may emerge a new entity made up of peoples living in the Volga and Urals regions, because today there are no grounds to speak of "inhabitants of Russia" as one whole, since there is no single system of values and interests in Russia and, accordingly, the Russian conglomerate of people and territories is not founded on a subculture; it is not organic, and it is held together only by the center's diktat. The Russian leadership thinks that there is such an entity as "the people of Russia," and the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, the Chuvash and Udmurt republics are simply geographic names within Russia. Thus, the peoples of the Russian Federation are practically denied self-determination; they become merely a populace. The center's aim at unitary statehood unwittingly pushes us into uniting, into creating a confederation that would become a prototype for Russia. The current situation demands unification of the peoples in the region in a joint struggle for sovereignty of our republics, to make the new "center" reckon with the people of the Volga and Urals region. This is the reason for the creation of the ANPU.

[Correspondent] What place does the ANPU envisage for the common federal center in the union of the region's peoples?

[Shamsutdinov] Russia has never been a federation, and so far there are no signs of it becoming one. "The Russian Federation" is a proper name, not an attribute of the state system. There are many people in the leadership of Russia whose dream is not to create a federative Russia but to restore the province-based system, and they are moving quite consistently toward implementing this goal. The ANPU, on the other hand, believes in the expediency of a different way of solving the ethnic problem—creating a federative state in which different people would enjoy equal rights and have an equal voice. The federative principle assumes a voluntary union of sovereign states on an equal basis into a new state entity. The main purpose of federal organs in this case is to protect the sovereign rights of its constituent components.

[Correspondent] How do you see cooperation between the peoples of the Urals-Volga region?

[Shamsutdinov] Trade between our republics should take precedence, and government programs should take into account the division of labor and cooperation of the Urals-Volga republics and oblasts. It makes sense now to set up a coordinating economic council. The second all-Udmurtia Congress and the Chuvash National Congress, in whose work we participated, forcefully brought

up the question of creating a regional ecology commission. The destruction of chemical weapons in Kizner had a ruinous effect on the health of Udmurtia's population, and the commission—chairmanship of which, by the way, we offered to Vil Mirzayanov—must insist on a ban on the destruction of chemical weapons in our region. The assembly believes that we need to organize permanent seminars of our peoples' intellectuals for the purpose of discussing vital problems. We will support each other in the struggle for the independent development of our culture and strengthening of our sovereignty. For this purpose we are planning to set up a common television network, a VOLGA-URAL newspaper, various magazines, a joint book distribution company, an association of independent ecologists, and a university of peoples of the Urals and Volga regions as a research and academic center; to hold annual Urals-Volga peoples cultural festivals; to prepare major publication of an encyclopedic nature on the history, folklore, and so on of the region's peoples; to facilitate the creation of ethnic districts and councils; and many other things.

[Correspondent] Is the ANPU a test site of sorts, an experiment for the leaders of the Urals and Volga republics, who are trying to protect their region from thoughtless actions on the part of the federal authorities?

[Shamsutdinov] I would like to believe that this is so. The conference of heads of six republics of the Volga region on Christmas Eve in Cheboksary is graphic evidence of this.

***Acrological Observatory Chief on Ozone Hole Over Siberia**

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[Interview with Vyacheslav Khattatov, deputy director of the Central Aerological Observatory, conducted by Sergey Kalenikin: "The Sky Over Siberia Has Opened Wide—And No One Knows Where This Will End"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *We seem to have become accustomed to the "ozone drama" over Antarctica, even though we know that since 1985 depletion of the ozone layer over the Southern Hemisphere has not only continued, but has in fact sharply intensified... Now, 10 years later, comes the latest sensational news, and unfortunately it is bad news. What the scientists least expected and most feared has happened: an ozone hole has gaped open in the middle latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere—over Russia!*

How do scientists assess and explain the current situation? That was the question that began our interview with Vyacheslav Khattatov, deputy director of the Central Aerological Observatory (TsAO—Tsentralnaya aerologicheskaya observatoriya).

[Khattatov] I must plainly state that scientists are not yet in a position either to understand or to explain why an ozone hole has appeared in the middle latitudes of the

Northern Hemisphere. We are dealing with a phenomenon that no one predicted or expected. But it is clear that this is trouble, i.e. that the situation is very close to the point where it could be termed catastrophic...

[Kalenikin] Do you mean to say that to you the ozone hole is a complete surprise, a mystery, like thunder on a cloudless day? Yet you were well aware that in the middle and upper latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere an intensive process of ozone layer destruction has been underway, and in fact has intensified to an extreme degree in recent years...

[Khattatov] You see, just three years ago no one would have dared claim that the ozone layer was being destroyed in the Northern Hemisphere, even though we had observed some effects. Naturally those effects concerned us, but at the time it was impossible to say what was actually happening, whether the ozone in the atmosphere was being redistributed or destroyed. We only knew for sure in late 1994, when despite all expectations a gigantic ozone anomaly opened up over an immense area stretching from the coast of the Arctic Ocean to the Crimea, i.e. an area in Western and Eastern Europe, the former USSR and the United States where throughout a 12-month period there was a 10-15 percent decrease in the ozone level, and in some places up to 20-30 percent! We have never observed this kind of large-scale, protracted deviation from many years' norms. Unfortunately, we still do not know the reasons for such catastrophic depletion of the ozone layer in the middle latitudes. Things are not that simple or obvious. In any event, the models currently used to describe ozone destruction do not "fit" this situation, which appears to require a more thorough and well-balanced analysis, and perhaps a completely different approach. It is possible that this "ozone drama" in the upper and middle latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere is connected with the well-known volcanic eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines, which, you will recall, occurred in June 1991. At that time a tremendous amount of volcanic material was thrown into the Earth's atmosphere—more than 20 megatons of sulfur compounds—and this obviously brought about a sharp decrease in the ozone level.

Yet even these plainly anomalous events in the atmosphere did not give us any reason to claim or predict that we were on the verge of a catastrophe. Nevertheless it happened: in February a record decline in the ozone level occurred over the entire Northern Hemisphere, and in particular over a number of areas in East Siberia and all the way to the Ural Mountains—by 40 percent! Note that whereas during this time of year those regions normally experience the so-called East Siberian maximum—when there is significantly more ozone than normal—this time there was a very sharp drop in the ozone level, and it lasted for a fairly long period of time, 25 days. By mid-March the situation had gotten much worse—ozone content had declined by a factor of two, i.e. by 50 percent! This clearly exhibited and conservatively stable phenomenon is the ozone hole.

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[Kalenikin] How does the Russian government view the ozone issue, and what steps have been taken in accordance with the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol?

[Khattatov] Our government has done nothing at all for a long time, that is to say, Russia is making no effort either to replace ozone-destroying technologies or to curtail production of ozone-destroying substances. As for general policy, there is complete inaction... True, not long ago government structures did bestir themselves. The problem is that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has expressed a willingness to provide support and financial aid to Russia, offering loans on special terms or even credits that do not have to be repaid, and these could total \$100 million per year—on the condition that our chemical industry carry out the necessary reconstruction and that Russia's government adopt and approve a national program that will include a schedule for our compliance with the Montreal Protocol. So why not take advantage of this opportunity? But no... If it were not for the bureaucratic red tape and the endless rotation of documents from one official to the next, Russia would have long since received the money. It appears that our country is not even capable of preparing the appropriate documentation in the proper form.

Efforts are being made in this direction only by individual enterprises which are interested in making their products competitive in the Western market. On their own, without any government decrees, they are introducing technologies for the production, for example, of refrigerators that use ozone-friendly substances. But the enterprises that serve the domestic market continue to pollute the atmosphere just like before. And that is of little concern to our government, including the presidential structures. Furthermore, from time to time high-ranking officials from the Security Council will flatly claim, as a vague sort of warning, that we must move very, very cautiously on the ozone issue, because supposedly the United States could impose its will on us and tie our hands, and that the ozone issue is a pseudo-problem anyway! Allegedly it was dreamed up by Dupont, and these are all its schemes, tricks and intrigues, with just one purpose: to crush our industry! Yes, if we fail to take action we definitely will be crushed. We are being given money, but only for specific Western technologies, and with strings attached. And that means dependence. That means that a sector of our national industry will be lost, and that there will be one less competitor. No one ever gives even a single ruble for no reason at all.

[Kalenikin] But Russia is not the only country that manufactures and distributes ozone-destroying substances...

[Khattatov] The situation is no better in China, India or Brazil. But I must admit that in those countries they are at least aware of how serious the ozone problem is. They just throw up their hands and say they have no money to restructure their industry, i.e. they ask for money. Western industrialists reacted to the ozone problem instantly, even before the Montreal Protocol was adopted. They realized that this international agreement was not just a game, it was their death sentence. Because when the Western countries signed the Montreal Protocol they pledged to pass appropriate legislation requiring industry to stop manufacturing Freon. For instance, in the United States no one had to order anyone to do anything, they simply levied an additional tax on every kilogram of Freon. Plus, it is a progressive tax: if today you are paying, say, one dollar per kilogram, a year from now you will be paying two, then in three years 10 dollars... If you like those terms, then pay the tax and use Freon, but in three years you will be facing bankruptcy.

Incidentally, many countries are not just using legislative measures, they are going beyond that. For example, in addition to the usual weather reports in Canada there is also a daily report on the levels and doses of radiation for the current day, and a prediction of radiation doses for the following day. Similar reports are issued by meteorological services in Great Britain and Australia... A similar decision has been approved by the Russian Government, requiring the Russian Federal Service on Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control to set up a national radiation monitoring service. But these measures will not solve the problem. How can we protect plants, crops and animals from the effects of harsh ultraviolet radiation?

To summarize, destruction of the ozone layer is not a matter for philosophical debate, it is a practical matter and a real problem of our times... And we do not know where it will end.

***Kemerovo 1994 Socioeconomic Figures Cited**

954F1964A Kemerovo KUZBASS in Russian 16 Feb 95
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[Report by the Kemerovo Oblast Committee on State Statistics: "The Kuzbass in 1994. Oblast Committee on State Statistics Submits Operational Information on the Oblast's Socioeconomic Situation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The basic indicators characterizing the results of the year are given below.

	1994	1994 as percent of 1993	
		Kemerovo Oblast	Russia
Industrial output, billions of rubles	11,857	89	79
Capital investments from all sources of financing, billions of rubles	2,873	75	74
Gross agricultural output, billions of rubles	1,004.8	90	91
Retail commodity turnover, billions of rubles	5,681	105	103
Paid services, billions of rubles	685.5	63	64
Consolidated consumer price index for goods and services, number of times ¹⁾	—	2.9times	3.2times
Volume of shipment of freight by transportation enterprises, millions of tonnes	467.7	84	76
Average monthly wages, thousands of rubles	331.3	3.6times	3.7times
Overall number of unemployed as of end of year, thousands	15.4	180	129

¹⁾ December 1994 compared to December 1993

Industry

In 1994 the volume of industrial output (work, services), according to short-term figures, was 11.9 trillion rubles [R] (in current prices), including R11.5 trillion produced by large and medium-sized enterprises.

The most important macroeconomic indicator characterizing the dynamics of industrial production is the index of physical volume, which provides a comparative evaluation of the volumes of industrial production of the current period with the base period, excluding the effect

of the price factor. The index of physical volume in 1994 in the oblast's industry as a whole as compared to the 1993 level was 89 percent.

The evaluation of the overall dynamics of industrial production as compared to Russia as a whole and the individual region of Western Siberia is given in the article "Toward the Results of 1994" in the newspaper KUZBASS of 24 January.

The change in the volumes of industrial production in the branches (in 1994 prices) is characterized by the following figures:

	1994 as percent of 1993 (index of physical volume)	
	Kemerovo Oblast	Russia
Industry of large- and medium-sized enterprises	89	77
of these		
electric energy	104.5	91
coal industry	91.7	89
ferrous metallurgy	97.3	83
chemical and petrochemical industry	80.3	71
machine-building and metal processing	63.3	61
timber and wood processing industry	70.1	69
construction materials industry	69.8	71
light industry	37.8	53
food industry	73.0	78

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Throughout last year there were structural changes in the production of industrial output in the direction of heavy industry. The proportion of products of electric energy enterprises and ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy enterprises increased and amounted to 46 percent of the overall volume of the oblast's production as compared to 42 percent in 1993.

The coal industry's share of the overall volume decreased and amounted to 29.8 percent as against 31.4 percent in 1993, and the proportion of machine-building products decreased from 6.5 percent in 1993 to 5.7 percent in 1994. Under conditions of the poor ability to compete and the difficult financial position of light industry enterprises, their share of the overall industrial production in the oblast decreased to 0.8 percent as against 1.8 percent in 1993. **The fuel and energy branch.** During 1994, 98.8 million tonnes of coal were produced (36.5 percent of the level for Russia), including coking coal—37.3 million (66.5 percent). Enriching plants produced 24 million tonnes of concentrate and electric power plants of the Kuzbassenergo joint-stock company produced 24.9 billion kilowatt-hours of electric energy and released 19 million gigacalories of thermal energy. As compared to 1993 the output of electric energy increased by 9 percent and the delivery of thermal energy decreased by the same amount. **Metallurgy.** In 1994 ferrous metallurgy enterprises produced 3.5 million tonnes of iron ore, 6.7 million tonnes of coal, 8.2 million tonnes of steel, 6.1 million tonnes of finished rolled metal, and 4.9 million tonnes of coke with 6 percent moisture content. The share of ferrous metallurgy products amounted to from 17 to 18 percent of the all-Russian production and coke—19 percent.

With respect to the majority of economical types of products of the branch the 1994 production level was below that of 1993. Among them were oxygen converter steel, rolled nonrusting steel, rolled metal with differentiated durability properties, shaped pieces for branch purposes, rolled alloy construction steel, etc. **Machine-building** produced 12,400 explosion-proof electric engines (52 percent of the 1993 amount), 2,700 direct current machines (37 percent), 5,200 trucks (73 percent), 6.7 million roller bearings (67 percent), and 2 million electric light bulbs (15 percent).

Of consumer goods the branch produced 35,600 vacuum cleaners (23 percent), 252,000 irons (32 percent), 10,300 Liliya washing machines (36 percent), 169,000 electric stoves (33 percent), and 8,400 color television sets (an eightfold increase).

The **chemical and petrochemical industry** produced synthetic ammonia—589,000 tonnes (81 percent of the 1993 level), sulfuric acid—168,000 tonnes (92 percent), mineral fertilizers—397,000 tonnes (102 percent), chemical fibers and filaments—20,800 tonnes (65 percent), and synthetic dyes—412 tonnes (52 percent).

The **timber and wood processing industry** manufactured 599,000 cubic meters of commercial timber (63 percent of the 1993 level), lumber—285,000 cubic meters (70 percent), wood fiberboard—632,000 square meters (22 percent), and wood chipboard—323 cubic meters (52 percent). **Light industry** produced 1,737,000 square meters of woolen fabrics (32 percent of the 1993 level), 20.7 million square meters of silk fabrics (48 percent), 790,000 knitted items (30 percent), and 443,000 pair of shoes (29 percent).

In 1994 there was a reduction of the production of the majority of types of goods from the children's assortment of underwear and outerwear, jackets, coats, car coats, trousers, and footwear.

The **food industry** produced meat, including subproducts of category I—38,000 tonnes (74 percent of the 1993 level), whole milk products calculated in terms of milk—148,000 tonnes (96 percent), and bread and bakery items—254,000 tonnes (82 percent). (Figures given taking into account the assessment of the volumes of production from small enterprises and also industrial subdivisions at nonindustrial organizations.)

The output of sausage items amounted to 23,000 tonnes (84 percent of the 1993 level), butter—4,600 tonnes (61 percent), canned goods—26.2 million conventional cans (78 percent), confectionery items—27,200 tonnes (95 percent), macaroni items—2,400 tonnes (28 percent), baking yeast—3,600 tonnes (77 percent), and commercial food fish products—873 tonnes (45 percent).

Capital Construction

Enterprises and organizations with all forms of ownership, according to preliminary estimates, assimilated R2.9 trillion in capital investments from all sources of financing (75 percent of the 1993 level). Structures of the nonstate sector of the economy account for almost three-fourths of all the investments as compared to 42 percent in 1993 and 13 percent in 1992.

The main source of financing capital investments, as is shown from the figures given below, are the internal funds of enterprises and the population, which account for 58 percent of the total volume of capital investments:

	billions of rubles	as percent of total	
		Kemerovo Oblast	Russia
Capital investments, total	2,873.1	100	100
including			
federal budget (including fund for support of priority branches)	291.8	10.2	13.6

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	billions of rubles	as percent of total	
		Kemerovo Oblast	Russia
local budget	252.1	8.8	10.5
preferred state investment credits	34.1	1.2	1.4
state nonbudget investment funds	621.1	21.6	5.9
funds of enterprises, population	1,674	58.2	68.6

About R1.9 trillion (81 percent of the 1993 level) was assimilated for construction of facilities for production purposes.

The greatest share of production investments (57 percent) went for the development of branches of the fuel and energy complex, increasing by four points as compared to 1993. There was a reduction of the proportion of capital investments for production purposes in the metallurgical, construction, chemical-timber, and agro-industrial complexes (one to four points).

Construction of facilities of the nonproduction sphere accounted for 35 percent of the overall investments. More than R1 trillion from all sources of financing went for the construction of facilities for nonproduction purposes, of which 60 percent was used for housing construction, 17 percent—for municipal construction, and 15 percent—for facilities for public health, public education, and culture.

Enterprises and organizations with all forms of ownership, according to preliminary estimates, built residential buildings with an overall area of 547,000 square meters, or 70 percent of the 1993 level (in all of Russia—92 percent).

The construction of individual houses with funds of the population and with the help of credit increased by 3 percent as compared to the preceding year, and their proportion of the overall volume of introduction of

housing throughout the oblast has increased almost twofold since the beginning of the 1990's.

For military servicemen and citizens discharged from the military service into the reserve or retirement, housing with an overall area of 40,000 square meters was built with funds from the federal budget.

From among the facilities for social and cultural purposes the following were commissioned: 10 general educational schools to accommodate 3,689 (57 percent of the 1993 level), preschool institutions to accommodate 1,030 (71 percent), hospitals with 150 beds (22 percent), outpatient clinics for 2,048 visits per shift (99.9 percent). A center for medical-social aid with 30 beds was introduced in the oblast center.

Construction subdivisions of the oblast did contracting work in a volume of R1.5 trillion, which is 19 percent less than in 1993 (throughout all of Russia—a reduction of 24 percent).

Agriculture

The gross agricultural output for 1994, according to preliminary calculations, decreased as compared to 1993 (in comparable evaluation) by 10 percent, including crop growing products—by 15 percent, and animal husbandry products—by 8 percent.

Production of the main agricultural products on farms of all categories is characterized by the following figures (the figures are calculated for the population and peasant farms):

	1994	1994 as percent of 1993	Proportion of individual categories of farms, percent		
			agricultural enterprises	farms of the population	peasant farms
Grain (weight after processing) thousands of tonnes	686	67	96.5		3.5
Potatoes, thousands of tonnes	691	106	11.6	86.2	2.2
Vegetables, thousands of tonnes	90	90	32.8	67.1	0.1
Cattle and poultry (live weight), thousands of tonnes	164	91	54.4	44.6	1.0
Milk, thousands of tonnes	646	94	58.2	41.0	0.8
Eggs, millions	887	92	72.2	27.8	0.0

The amount of grain produced in 1994 was 33 percent less than in 1993, vegetables—10 percent less, and potatoes—6 percent more than in 1993. Most of the grain was raised on agricultural enterprises (96 percent) and potatoes and vegetables—on private subsidiary farms of the population (67-86 percent).

Against the background of the drop in the production of meat, milk, and eggs at agricultural enterprises (17 percent, 13 percent, and 12 percent, respectively) there was a certain increase in the production of these kinds of products on farms belonging to the population (2 percent, 6 percent, and 3 percent, respectively).

The per capita meat production decreased from 37 kg in 1993 to 34 kg in 1994, milk—from 217 kg to 207 kg, respectively, and eggs—from 305 to 285.

The number of head of cattle in the oblast as of the beginning of 1995, according to short-term figures, was 598,000 head or 13 percent less than a year ago, hogs—565,000 head (18 percent less). The number of head of cows practically stabilized (276,000 head).

At the present time 31 percent of the overall number of head of cattle are being kept in private yards, 38 percent of the cows, 35 percent of the hogs, and practically all of the sheep and goats.

In 1994 all agricultural producers sold through all channels 32,000 tonnes of potatoes, 27,000 tonnes of vegetables, 87,000 tonnes of cattle and poultry, 300,000 tonnes of milk, and 588 million eggs.

Agricultural enterprises are reducing sales of products to procurement organizations and looking for other channels for selling their products. Sale on the markets, through the private trade network, and barter transactions are providing a partial solution to the problem of relations with the procurement agents.

By the end of 1994 grain receiving enterprises had received 27,500 tonnes of grain, which is 3.4 percent of the harvested crop. A total of 10,000 tonnes of grain was accepted from the farms for accountable storage and more than 418,000 tonnes of grain is still on the farms of the agricultural producers.

Winter crops for the 1995 harvest have been planted on an area of 20,500 hectares as compared to 34,500 hectares in 1993. The fallow has been plowed on 508,000 hectares, which is 103 percent of last year's area.

Agricultural enterprises have stored up 172,000 tonnes of seeds of spring grain crops for spring planting—95 percent of the amount needed.

Transportation and Communications

Under the conditions of the reduction of volumes of public production and the nonpayment crisis, the shipment of cargo by enterprises with all types of transportation in 1994 was characterized by the following figures:

	1994	1994 as percent of 1993	
		Kemerovo Oblast	Russia
Shipment (dispatch) of freight, total, millions of tonnes	476.7	84	76
including			
rail	136.1	87	78
automotive	340.6	83	70
air, thousands of tonnes	17	63	80
inland water, thousands of tonnes	191.3	99	71

On rail transportation of the Ministry of Railways the reduction of the overall volume of shipment of freight was brought about mainly by the reduction of shipments of hard coal (11 percent), which holds a dominant position (72 percent) in the overall volume of shipments. There was a reduction in the shipment of iron ore and nonferrous metals (3 percent), cement (28 percent), and timber (40 percent). The shipments of chemical and mineral fertilizers increased (by 5 percent).

On general purpose automotive, rail, air, and inland water transportation there was a reduction in passenger turnover as compared to 1993 by 14 percent, which was brought about by the reduction of the mobility of the population because of higher passenger fares.

The lack of uniformity in the increase in rates led to changes in the structure of passenger transportation. In 1994 half of the volume of passenger turnover was in

automotive transportation, which is 3 percent more than in 1993. There was a corresponding reduction in the proportion of passenger turnover by rail and air transport.

Last year considerable attention was devoted to repair and construction of highways. During the year 129 kilometers were constructed and reconstructed (including the street-road network), and 1,027 kilometers of highways were repaired.

Services granted by general purpose communications enterprises increased as compared to 1993 in actual prices by a factor of 4.6, including to the population—by a factor of 5.1, which was basically caused by the higher rates.

Foreign Economic Activity

The oblast's foreign trade turnover with countries of the far and near abroad under independent contracts and

deliveries through Kuzbass intermediary structures (according to short-term figures) amounted to R4.1 trillion, including exports—R3.0 trillion, and imports—R1.1 trillion.

In 1994 the volume of export-import operations of enterprises in the oblast (not including the CIS countries) amounted to \$1.591 billion and, as compared to 1993, increased by 53 percent, including exports—\$1.206 billion (55 percent), and imports—\$385 million (48 percent). The foreign trade balance was positive in the amount of \$821 million.

The predominant item in the commercial structure of exports throughout the year was metallurgical products—72.5 percent of the overall volume of exports (in 1993—54 percent). Fuel and energy products accounted for 20.3 percent (37.5 percent), products of the chemical industry—6.4 percent (7.6 percent), and machines and equipment—0.5 percent (0.4 percent).

In the commodity structure of imports in 1994, machines and equipment accounted for 52 percent of the overall volume of imports (in 1993—54 percent), mineral fertilizers—16.4 percent (16.8 percent), products of the chemical industry—6.1 percent (6.0 percent), food products and raw material for their production—4 percent (3.6 percent), textile clothing and footwear—2.9 percent (2.5 percent), and ferrous and nonferrous metals and items made from them—1.2 percent (1.0 percent).

Foreign economic activity is developing in the area of services. In 1994 there was a considerable increase in the imports of services—\$54 million (exports—\$91,000). In the overall volume of imports of services construction services occupy the largest proportion (95 percent). Volumes of imports of services are increasing in the area of training, public health, transportation services, marketing, insurance, advertising, and tourism.

Prices

In 1994 price dynamics developed under the influence of various factors. The growth of the rates of inflation in the consumer market stabilized to a certain degree and decreased from 25 percent in January to 5 percent from July through September. The lowest increase in inflation in the consumer market was observed in April (4 percent).

At the same time throughout the year there were tendencies that bring about acceleration of inflation. Liberalization of the sphere of paid services continued, which was accompanied by high rates of increase of their cost during January-May. The saturation of the oblast domestic market was achieved to a significant degree through imported products and goods and was dependent on the exchange rate of the ruble as compared to the dollar. The overwhelming decline of the ruble exchange rate in October as compared to the U.S. dollar had an effect on the rates of inflation in the Kuzbass.

From January through December of last year prices in the consumer market increased by a factor of 2.9 (in 1993—by a factor of 13). There was a considerable increase in the cost of paid services. The average monthly rate of price increases for foodstuffs was 9.2 percent, nonfoodstuffs—8.7 percent, and paid services—17.7 percent.

The rates of increase in the prices of the main food products in December by a factor of 2.8 were higher than the average monthly rates of increase during January-September. And since the beginning of the year prices of eggs and egg products increased by a factor of 6.2, salt and spices—by a factor of 5.1, oil and fats, and macaroni items—by a factor of 4.6, cereal and legumes—by a factor of 4.1, milk and dairy products and flour—by a factor of 3.5, bread and bakery items, sugar, fish and fish products—by a factor of 3.2, vegetables—by a factor of 2.7, and meat and meat products—by a factor of 2.3.

The cost of the selection of the 19 main food products per month as of 27 December throughout the oblast amounted to R105,800, and in Kemerovo—R105,500.

The growth rates of the prices of nonfoodstuffs were more moderate than for food products. At the same time there was a tendency toward more rapid growth of prices of certain goods. Thus, as compared to December 1993, coal prices increased by a factor of 21, printed publications—by a factor of 8.3, school notebooks—by a factor of 5.7, household chemicals—by a factor of 5.4, gasoline—by a factor of 4.7, metal dishes and household items—by a factor of 4.1, medications—by a factor of 4.4, bond paper and school writing items—by a factor of 4, and construction materials and sports goods—by a factor of 3.5.

The range of the fluctuations in the rates of increase in the cost of paid services to the population exceeds 10-fold. Since the beginning of the year the cost of housing and municipal services increased 15.4-fold, passenger transportation—9.4-fold, communications—4.3-fold, services of a legal nature—3.4-fold, service of cultural institutions—3.6-fold, and services for keeping children in preschool institutions—3.2-fold.

Consumer Market

In 1994 the situation in the consumer market was relatively stable. Consumer goods amounting to R5.7 trillion were sold to the population, which in actual prices is four times more and in comparable prices 5 percent more than in 1993.

The growth of the overall volume of commodity turnover was achieved to a considerable degree as a result of expanding trade in the general merchandise, mixed, and food markets. The nonstate sector reinforced its dominant position in the consumer market. Its share of the volume of retail commodity turnover amounted to 81 percent as compared to 76 percent in 1993.

Last year R2.7 trillion worth of food products were sold to the population along with R3.0 trillion worth of nonfoodstuffs. And the volume of sales of nonfood

products increased at more rapid rates, their growth amounting to 10 percent over the year (food products—5 percent).

Practically throughout the entire year the saturation of retail trade with such food products as meat, sausage items, dairy products, macaroni items, and fish products was at the level of 100-120 percent. The consumer market was saturated to a lesser degree with vegetables, certain kinds of cereals, and sugar.

Standard of Living Monetary incomes and expenditures. The nominal incomes of the population during 1994 amounted to a total of R9.1 trillion and increased by a factor of 3.9 as compared to the 1993 level. Real disposable monetary income (nominal income minus mandatory payments and contributions adjusted by the price index) decreased by 5 percent.

Of the overall volume of monetary incomes during 1994, the population spent on goods and services R5.8 trillion (63.9 percent), taxes and fees—R0.7 trillion (7.4 percent), savings in deposits and securities and the purchase of hard currency—R0.6 trillion (6.6 percent).

In the structure of the utilization of monetary incomes of the population as compared to 1993 there was an

increase in the proportion of consumer expenditures, savings in deposits and securities, and the purchase of hard currency, and the proportion of cash money decreased. **Wages.** The average monthly wages of one worker in 1994 (not including payments of a social nature) amounted to R331,300 and increased as compared to 1993 by a factor of 3.6. In December wages reached R503,000, the increase as compared to November was 20 percent, and as compared to December 1993—a factor of 2.3.

The amount of the real wages, calculated taking the consumer price index into account, in December amounted to 105 percent of the level of November 1994 and 82 percent of the level of December 1993.

In December the average wage exceeded the established minimum level by a factor of 20 and, based on the exchange rate of the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange, amounted to \$142.

The change in the average monthly wages in December 1994 in the various branches of the economy is characterized by the following figures:

December 1994

	thousands of rubles	as percent of		
		December 1993, times	November 1994	average wages in oblast
Total in enterprises and organizations accounted for	502.7	2.3	120	100
including:				
industry	583.2	2.3	119	116
agriculture	251.2	2.2	123	50
transportation	575.2	2.1	127	114
construction	610.0	2.2	116	121
housing and municipal services, nonproduction types of consumer services	466.1	2.6	111	93
public health, physical culture, and social security	330.6	2.7	118	66
education	236.5	3.3	104	47
culture and art	223.7	2.7	115	44
science and scientific service	483.3	2.9	159	96
credit, finance, insurance, and pension support	1,086.0	2.8	219	216
apparatus of administrative organs	490.0	2.8	136	97

Payments of a social nature (material assistance, payments for food, travel, housing, etc.) per one worker in December amounted to R67,000 and increased by a factor of 2.7 as compared to November. **Employment.** According to calculations, the number of economically active population as of the end of the year amounted to 1,434,000. Among them,

135,100 (94.2 percent) were employed in the economy and 83,000 (5.8 percent) were not employed and, in keeping with the ILO methodology were classified as unemployed. There were 15,400 people officially registered with organs of the employment service as unemployed, or 11 percent of the economically active population.

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There was an increase in the number of applications to the employment service from the unemployed population in search of work. In 1994 43,000 unemployed citizens were registered and 13,600 of them (32 percent) were placed in jobs. Among those who applied to employment service organs there was an increase in the number of school children and students looking for work during school vacation from 2.7 percent in 1993 to 5.6 percent in 1994. There was an increase in the number of pensioners and individuals looking for work for the first time.

As of the end of the year 15,400 people had the status of unemployed, which is 1.8 times more than in 1993. One-third of the unemployed are youth under 30 years of age and about 5 percent are graduates of VUZ's [higher educational institutions] and tekhnikums. One out of seven unemployed people live in rural areas. About half of the overall number of unemployed (48 percent) have had this status for more than four months and one out of eight has not had a job for more than a year.

Demographic Situation

Appreciable changes occurred in the demographic situation in the oblast last year.

A positive aspect of this process is that in 1988 for the first time in the oblast the decline of the birthrate came to a halt. In 1994, according to preliminary figures, 28,400 newborns made their appearance in the Kuzbass (1993—28,100).

But improvement of the situation with the natural reproduction of the population is impeded by the continuing growth of the death rate. The number of deaths exceeded the number of births by a factor of 1.9 and amounted to 52,900, which is greater than the 1993 level by 9.3 percent.

The number of residents of the oblast who died from tuberculosis was greater than last year (by 19 percent), diseases of the digestive organs (28.8 percent), alcohol poisoning (7.4 percent), and suicide (12.4 percent).

At the same time there is a certain reduction of the number of individuals who died from tumors, murders, and highway accidents.

The losses of the population from natural reproduction is compensated for to a certain extent by the considerably greater migration influx, which amounted to 18,700 as against 1,400 last year.

A considerable proportion of the growth of migration (58.8 percent) came from refugees and individuals forced to resettle. According to data from the oblast migration service, by the beginning of 1995 there were 14,300 forced migrants in the Kuzbass.

Last year 3,700 citizens moved to the far abroad for permanent residence (1993—4,000, 1992—4,200).

Taking into account the tendencies that have developed, the reduction of the number of residents of the oblast from natural reproduction and migration has been on a considerably lesser scale than in 1993 (5,800 people as against 18,900).

*Moscow Oblast Faces Economic, Social Crisis

954F2085A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Apr 95 p 2

[Article by Valeriy Tokarev, Moscow Oblast Duma Deputy: "The Oblast Duma Has Appealed to Federal Authorities: the Suburban Moscow Area Has Found Itself on the Brink of a Catastrophe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At one of the recent sittings of the Moscow Oblast Duma at the end of March of this year, an appeal to the Russian Federation [RF] President, the speakers of both houses of parliament and the prime minister was adopted. In this document, the deputies direct the attention of the leaders of Russia's federal organs of state authority to the fact that the financial and economic condition of the national economy and the social sphere in Moscow Oblast is at a catastrophic level. The crisis situation is associated with the enterprises' mutual nonpayments, the lack of working capital and the indebtedness with respect to the payment of wages, including from the funds of the federal and oblast budgets.

The situation was aggravated in connection with the adoption by the organs of state authority of standards acts which did not provide financial resources from the federal budget.

The possibilities for finding additional sources of funding within the oblast have been exhausted. Moreover, the procedure established by the federal law of 1 February 1995 on the Funding of State Expenditures From the Federal Budget in the First Quarter of 1995 for entering the income tax from natural persons into the budgets of RF components substantially undermines the Moscow Oblast budget's revenue base. In the first place, this applies to the budgets for local self-government, the losses of which, as a result of the establishment of the 10-percent deductions from the income tax from natural persons to the federal budget in the first quarter of 1995, will amount to 25 billion rubles [R] and, in the event that the indicated procedure is extended to the entire current year, they will amount to more than R100 billion.

Taking into consideration the extremely tense socio-economic situation and the difficult situation in the labor collectives, the Moscow Oblast Duma has made an urgent request for the adoption of urgent measures to ensure the paying off of the indebtedness to the Moscow Oblast's budget for 1994 and the implementation of the cited standards acts of the RF's organs of state authority.

In the appeal, the oblast deputies stated that, if the federal authorities did not fulfill the deputies' requests, then the Moscow Oblast Duma would reserve to itself the right to

revoke the signature of Duma Chairman A. Vorontsov on the Agreement on Social Harmony, inasmuch as, in the agreement signed in April of 1994, the federal organs of authority took upon themselves the obligation to stabilize the socioeconomic situation in Russia.

The other day, a letter arrived in the Moscow Oblast Duma from RF Deputy Minister of Finance I. Molchanov. It reported that the RF Federal Assembly's Federation

Council had adopted a decree which provided for leaving in the RF components' budgets the federal share of the tax from natural persons to cover the expenditures for maintaining installations of the social sphere and the housing resources which had been transferred to municipal ownership. Presently, the RF Ministry of Finance is working out the mechanism for implementing the decision adopted on this matter.

Kazakhstan

***Chechen Campaign Results Now To Be Assessed**
95UM0367A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No
10, 17-23 Mar 95 p 2

[Article by Alexander Zhilin, MN military commentator:
"One Hundred Days of War in Chechnya"; first para-
graph is introductory paragraph]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] No matter how the war ends,
one thing for sure is that it has become a tragedy for the
Russian Army.

The intermediate results of the campaign look
depressing. Federal forces managed to capture the Naur-
sky, Nadterechny and Shelkovsky regions with almost no
resistance, and established a relative control over the
ruins of Grozny. The remaining territory is still partly (in
the day yours, at night ours) or fully under the control of
the Chechen fighters. According to different estimates,
the Russian troops have lost about 5,000 men. Among
the civilians, over 20,000 were killed with over 300,000
currently refugees and struggling desperately to survive.
The Republic's economy has already suffered an esti-
mated \$46-52 billion in damage. Six settlements were
demolished completely and eighty are partially ruined. If
the fighters do not stop their resistance, the towns of
Argun, Samashki and Shali will be destroyed by bombing
during the next two weeks.

Since Russia has no appropriate legal mechanism legis-
lating the use of troops in internal conflicts, the opera-
tion in Chechnya began without official decrees, orders
or written resolutions. As military legal experts say, this
makes the Chechen campaign illegal.

Legal baselessness of the operation has already caused
crisis in the leadership of the defense ministry. Boris
Gromov, Georgy Kondratyev and Valery Mironov, all
deputy defense ministers, raised objections against
unplanned force in the region. One of them (Kondra-
tyev) was in effect fired and the others were forced to
leave the agency. However, this did not settle the crisis in
the defense ministry. Observers maintain that the
"Afghan" group of opposition generals might soon be
replaced by the so-called "Chechen" group where Pavel
Grachev would have trouble finding his niche. The new
strategists of the civil war who now gain influence will
not want to get along with the minister who has lost
support from the troops.

From the first day of the Chechen campaign it became
clear that the Russian Army has not a single efficient
division or even regiment. Never before have military
districts formed new fighting units and sent them to war.
Even the elite Kantemirovskaya and Tamanskaya divi-
sions had to collect officers and soldiers from different
units. According to data obtained from the General
headquarters, up to 60 percent of tank and armored
vehicle crews were formed on the way to Mozdok or just
before the offensive.

As a result, the military operation in Chechnya resulted
in irrational violence. Issuing the order to carry out huge
air and artillery strikes against the city, the defense
minister consciously sacrificed its peaceful residents.
Using bombers during bad weather and low visibility
forced pilots to bomb from considerable heights and
from above the clouds, which means at random. When
the "Grad" and "Uragan" volley fire systems were put
into operation it became clear that casualties among the
civilians would be counted in the thousands.

The Russian air force was compelled to perform a
punitive action maybe for the first time in its history.
Use of "pellet" and "needle" ammunition to bomb a
settlement is forbidden even in international wars.

The Chechen operation has also shown the weakness of
the Armed Forces in mobilization readiness. According
to the office of general inspection, the defense ministry's
effort to carry out the partial mobilization of citizens and
the transportation infrastructure was an outright failure.
Specialists have expressed fears that in the case that war
is declared, the recruiting stations will not be able to
mobilize reinforcements and find transportation for
them in the civil economy. This means that Russia is
completely unready to resist any considerable attack
from outside its borders.

The spring selective draft is also under threat of failure.
Experts estimate that only 25-30 percent of draftees who
have no deferments will be called up for military service.
This is only if the mothers of these soldiers do not carry
out any nationwide anti-army actions.

Experts maintain that the Chechen operation, which was
also meant to curb crime in the region, has instead led to
its escalation. Arms from the conflict zone are being
spread across the country with perfect impunity. It is
important to note that it is federal troops that do this
business. We know this from those lawsuits filed already
by the Federal Counterintelligence Service against army
officers. I would also like to note that in Afghanistan that
kind of business was widely spread amongst members of
the Russian military.

One must not forget that soldiers who learned their
lessons of violence from the Chechen campaign are due
to return home later this year. Specialists are predicting
the emergence of a "Chechen Syndrome" that may spur
the growth of major crimes like robbery and murder.
One cannot rule out the possibility that gangs will receive
experienced, cynical and impudent replenishments. If
we observe that all of this coincides with the beginning of
the second stage of privatization, connected with land
and property relations, we may speak of a cold summer
to come.

These are the intermediate results of the Chechen war
and there is still no end in sight.

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Turkmenistan

***Charges Against Turkmenistan Opposition Leaders Dropped**

954E0827A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 30 Mar 95 p 15

[Article by Aleksey Sokovnin: "The Turkmenistan Opposition Case: Dissidents Did Not Aspire to Role as Political Assassins"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Moscow Prosecutor's Office has closed its investigation of a criminal case accusing Murat Esenov and Khalmurat Soynov, leaders of the Turkmen opposition in Moscow, of preparing an attempt on the life of Turkmenistan's president. The charge was made by the Turkmenistan authorities in an attempt to get the opposition leaders deported back to their homeland. However, in the course of an investigation carried out by the Moscow prosecutor's office, Soynov's and Esenov's involvement in preparations for an assassination attempt were not proven, and the charges were dropped. According to KOMMERSANT-DAILY's information, the opposition leaders have now emigrated to Sweden to escape persecution by Turkmen intelligence services.

According to the case file, in the early 1990's Turkmen opposition members Khalmurat Soynov (formerly mayor of the city of Kyzyl-Arbat), Avdy Kuliyeu (until 1992 Turkmenistan's minister of foreign affairs) and his assistant Murat Esenov were forced to leave their home country due to their disagreement with Saparmurat Niyazov's authoritarian regime. Upon arriving in Moscow the dissidents organized the Turkmenistan Social and Political Foundation, in the name of which they began publishing the opposition magazine TURKMEN-ILI in early 1994. At the same time they were also actively cooperating with the Moscow bureau of Radio Liberty. At their press conferences the dissidents spoke out in defense of human rights in Turkmenistan, exposed corruption in President Niyazov's inner circle, and demanded his resignation.

In August-September 1994 Soynov and Esenov held a number of meetings with fellow countrymen in Moscow, in the course of which they discussed plans for the constitutional (they claim) removal of Niyazov from power. The conspirators planned to use opposition forces to organize massive demonstrations in Ashkhabad and around Niyazov's suburban residence in Firyuza in late 1994. The plan was to use those actions to bring about Niyazov's resignation and then nominate Avdy Kuliyeu as a candidate for president. Obviously the opposition's plans also came to the attention of Turkmenistan's intelligence services: in October 1994 Soynov and Kuliyeu were brutally beaten by unidentified individuals (the incidents are currently under investigation). But this did not kill their resolve to overthrow the Turkmen-bashi regime.

As a result, in November 1994 the Investigative Department of the Turkmenistan Committee for National Security filed criminal charges accusing Soynov and Esenov of preparing to assassinate the president of Turkmenistan, and in connection with this an extradition request was sent to the Russian General Prosecutor's Office. Turkmenistan claimed that members of the opposition had planned an armed attack on Turkmen-bashi in Firyuza (for which purpose they had allegedly attempted to obtain a plan of the presidential mansion).

At the request of Turkmenistan's law enforcement agencies Esenov and Soynov were arrested in Moscow in late November 1994. One month later, on 20 December, the Moscow Prosecutor's Office filed criminal charges against them, accusing them of preparing a terrorist act (at the same time releasing them from custody on account of their exemplary behavior). During the investigation Esenov and Soynov insisted that they had always acted solely "by constitutional means," and witnesses testified that there had been no discussion of assassinating the president of Turkmenistan at the meetings in Moscow. Finally the charges were dropped for lack of evidence.

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